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THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW MARKET 
J. HASKELL MURRAY∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 During the last seven years, over thirty states have passed at 
least one social enterprise statute.  These social enterprise 
statutes allow the formation of a plethora of new entity types, 
including low-profit limited liability companies, benefit 
corporations, benefit limited liability companies, public benefit 
corporations, and social purpose corporations.  Social 
enterprises have attracted increasing academic attention, but 
virtually nothing has been written on if and how states are 
competing for these entities.  This Article attempts to fill that 
void, while also providing a history of the social enterprise forms, 
a comparative analysis, and recommendations for states that 
wish to engage in jurisdictional competition in the social 
enterprise law market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In her iconic book The Genius of American Corporate Law, Professor 
Roberta Romano claims “federalism spurs innovation in public policy 
because of the incremental experimentation afforded by fifty laboratories of 
states competing for citizens and firms.”1  The legal academy has given 
much attention to jurisdictional competition for traditional business 
associations such as corporations and limited liability companies 
(“LLCs”).2  Delaware has long been recognized as the clear winner in the 
                                                          
 1.  ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 5 (1993) (first citing 
THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990); then 
citing COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (Daphne A. Kenyon & John 
Kincaid eds., 1991)). 
 2.  See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits 
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); Bruce H. Kobayashi & 
Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Liability 
Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91 (2011); Jeffry Netter & Annette Poulsen, State Corporation 
Laws and Shareholders: The Recent Experience, 18 FIN. MGMT. 29 (1989); Larry E. Ribstein & 
Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661 (2008); 
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 225 (1985). 
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competition among the states for these traditional business associations, 
with some academics arguing that the competition has been a “race to the 
bottom” and others contending that the competition has been a “race to the 
top.”3  More recently, commentators have claimed other states do not now 
pose much of a threat to Delaware’s dominance, and that the federal 
government is the main check on Delaware’s power in the law market for 
traditional business associations.4  To date, the behavior surrounding 
emerging social enterprise forms, such as low-profit limited liability 
companies and benefit corporations, has not been thoroughly discussed or 
analyzed.  Also, unlike the situation with the more traditional business 
associations, currently Delaware does not appear to be the dominant state in 
the social enterprise law market. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview and brief history of social 
enterprise forms in the United States, along with discussion of the related, 
early academic literature.  Part II describes many of the innovations in the 
social enterprise law area and the various iterations of these laws.  Part III 
asks why states are passing social enterprise laws, and provides a new 
theory of jurisdictional positioning to describe states that are not engaged in 
full competition but wish to remain poised to compete if the stakes are 
raised.  Part IV describes the various interest groups that are impacting the 
passage and shape of social enterprise laws, including activists, managers, 
politicians, and skeptics.  Finally, Part V examines hand-collected data on 
social enterprise forms, providing a description of the current social 
enterprise landscape and offering advice to states that wish to compete for 
social enterprises in the future.  This Article concludes by drawing on the 
Delaware experience to predict the characteristics of the winning state in 
any future jurisdictional competition that may arise over social enterprises. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF U.S. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW AND LITERATURE 
A.  Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies (“L3Cs”) 
The 2008 Vermont Low-Profit Limited Liability statute was both the 
first L3C statute and the first social enterprise statute in the United States.  
Since 2008, eight additional states and two federal tribal jurisdictions have 
                                                          
 3.  See, e.g., RALPH K. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 7–11 (1978) (race 
to the bottom); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 
YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (race to the bottom); Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and 
Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984) (race to the top); 
Romano, supra note 2, at 265–73. 
 4.  Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: 
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 558, 604–05 (2002); 
Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591 (2003). 
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passed L3C statutes.5  Effective January 1, 2014, North Carolina became 
the first of the nine original L3C states to repeal its L3C statute, though it 
allowed previously formed L3Cs to continue to exist in the state.6  The L3C 
concept is championed by Robert “Bob” Lang, the Chief Executive Officer 
of The Mary Elizabeth & Gordon B. Mannweiler Foundation.7  Mr. Lang 
worked with attorneys on the L3C concept but is not a lawyer himself.8 
L3C statutes were drafted, primarily, to target Program Related 
Investments (“PRI”) from foundations, and thereby aid social enterprises in 
their attempts to raise capital.9  The statutes mirror, in many respects, the 
PRI regulations and often simply replace “investment” in the regulations 
with “company” in the L3C statutes.10  The L3C statutes require that the 
L3C “significantly furthers the accomplishment of one or more charitable 
or educational purposes” and require that the L3C “would not have been 
formed but for the company’s relationship to the accomplishment of 
charitable or educational purposes.”11  The L3C statutes also require that 
“[n]o significant purpose of the company is the production of income or the 
appreciation of property” but the statutes make clear that the production of 
                                                          
 5.  Steven R. Chiodini & David A. Levitt, Program-Related Investing in L3Cs: A Question-
and-Answer Guide, 118 J. TAX’N 41, 41, 43 n.10 (2013) (listing Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, 
Michigan, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming, Oglala Sioux Tribe and the 
Crow Indian Nation of Montana); see also Here’s the Latest L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, 
L3C (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c_tally.html (listing the month and year that 
each L3C statute was passed, the number of L3Cs formed in each jurisdiction, and the L3C 
company names).   
 6.  Cass Brewer, Hybrid Business Entities in 2014, SOCENTLAWBLOG (Jan. 6, 2014), 
http://socentlaw.com/2014/01/hybrid-business-entities-in-2014/; Anne Field, North Carolina 
Officially Abolishes the L3C, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2014/01/11/north-carolina-officially-abolishes-the-l3c/. 
 7.  Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L3C, History, Basic Construct, and Legal 
Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15, 15 (2010) (stating that Bob Lang conceived of the L3C form in 
2005). 
 8.  Robert Lang, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/pub/robert-lang/b/b0/aa2 (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2015). 
 9.  Lang & Minnigh supra note 7, at 15–17; John A. Pearce II & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, 
Regulation of L3Cs for Social Entrepreneurship: A Prerequisite to Increase Utilization, 92 NEB. 
L. REV. 259, 272–73 (2013) (explaining that L3C proponents intended for the L3C to attract PRIs 
from foundations, but stating that L3C investments do not automatically qualify as PRIs and 
noting that at least one senior IRS agent has encouraged caution when attempting to invest in a 
L3C as a PRI).  PRIs are investments that are not made for financial reasons, but to facilitate the 
exempt purpose of a private foundation.  Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social 
Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 355–56 (2009).  In addition, the “IRS considers all 
moneys paid out as PRIs to be ‘qualifying distributions,’ which means they count toward the 
IRS’s requirement that private foundations spend five percent of their net worth in any given 
year.” Id. at 356. 
 10.  Pearce II & Hopkins, supra note 9, at 261–62 (noting that the L3C statutes were intended 
to mirror the PRI requirements).  
 11.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4162(1) (2010).  Other state L3C statutes largely 
follow Vermont’s lead.  Cassady V. Brewer & Michael J. Rhim, Using the ‘L3C’ for Program-
Related Investments, TAX’N EXEMPTS, Nov./Dec. 2009, at 11, 13 (noting that the Vermont L3C 
statute is similar to the L3C statutes in other states).  
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significant income or the appreciation property standing alone is not 
conclusive evidence of a statutory violation.12  The L3C proponents 
believed that if the L3C statutes required of companies the same thing that 
the PRI regulations require of investments, an L3C would become a safe 
place for foundations to make PRIs, without need for costly written legal 
opinions from counsel or advanced private letter rulings by the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”).13  To date, however, the IRS has not expressly 
endorsed the L3C as an unassailable safe harbor for PRIs.14  Lang promoted 
a tranched investment structure for L3Cs where foundations would provide 
high-risk, low-return capital, which would make it more likely that 
traditional investors would obtain a market return.15 
Lang and his supporters have touted the L3C as aiding private 
foundations in the PRI process; a “for-profit with [a] nonprofit soul” that 
serves both profit and social purpose;16 a branding vehicle; and a way, 
through his proposed tranched investment structure, to provide each set of 
investors their desired social and financial returns.17  Professors and 
practitioners quickly launched significant criticism against the L3C.  These 
skeptics claimed, among other things, that the statutes did not significantly 
protect or aid private foundations in the PRI process; LLCs could serve the 
same purpose as the L3C under the current tax law; the statutes were 
overhyped and the claims of L3C proponents were overly optimistic; the 
skeletal L3C statute was insufficient to deal with the complexities 
stemming from the conflicts between the “two masters” of profit and 
purpose; and the proposed tranched investments were impractical and could 
                                                          
 12.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4162(2).   
 13.  Robert M. Lang, Jr., The L3C: The New Way to Organize Socially Responsible and 
Mission Driven Organizations, 36 ALI-ABA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 251, 253–56 (2007) 
(describing his view on how the L3C can cut costs for foundations looking to make a PRI); cf. 
John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C 
Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 125–26 (2010) (noting that L3Cs do not 
have to attract PRIs and that there may be uses for the L3C form outside of the foundation and 
PRI contexts).   
 14.  See Jamie Hopkins, Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies: High-Risk Tax Fad or 
Legitimate Social Investment Planning Opportunity?, 2014 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 35, 42–
43, (2014) http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/HOPKINS_2014_35.pdf (first 
citing IRS, Proposed Guidelines, Examples of Program Related Investments, 77 Fed. Reg. 23,429 
(proposed Apr. 19, 2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 53), https://federalregister.gov/a/2012-9468; 
then citing Carter G. Bishop, The Low Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy 
or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 250 (2010)) (noting that the IRS has proposed rules with 
examples of proper PRIs suggesting that L3Cs could be a proper recipient, but also noting that the 
IRS guidance does not provide a complete safe harbor for L3Cs and sufficient caution is 
recommended). 
 15.  Lang & Minnigh, supra note 7, at 17–19 (explaining the proposed tranched L3C 
investment structure). 
 16.  Id. at 17. 
 17.  See generally Lang, Jr., supra note 13; Lang & Minnigh supra note 7; Arthur Wood, 
Transcript: New Legal Structures to Address the Social Capital Famine, 35 VT. L. REV. 45 
(2010). 
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lead to private inurement that may jeopardize the investing foundations’ tax 
exemptions.18  A few commentators largely agreed with the criticisms, but 
also suggested reforms for the L3C law.  The suggested reforms for the 
L3C law included the following: amend the proposed tranched model by 
replacing traditional investors with social investors; require at least one tax-
exempt investor; add reporting and registration requirements for certain 
L3Cs; require at least a partial asset lock for L3Cs engaged in mergers and 
acquisitions activity; and provide free transferability and withdraw by any 
tax-exempt member of an L3C.19 
Possibly in response to the academic and practitioner criticism, the 
passing of the L3C statutes has been at a relative standstill, with the last 
L3C statute passed in 2012.20  From 2012 to present, over a dozen state 
social enterprise statutes, of types other than the L3C, were passed.21  The 
number of L3C statutes has actually decreased since 2012; as mentioned 
above, effective January 1, 2014, North Carolina repealed its L3C statute.22  
Currently, there are reported to be approximately 1200 L3Cs and most are 
small, closely held entities.23 
B.  Benefit Corporations and Benefit LLCs 
In 2010, Maryland passed the first benefit corporation statute.24  
Currently, over two dozen states have passed benefit corporation statutes, a 
few of which are “public benefit corporation” statutes, discussed below in a 
                                                          
 18.  Bishop, supra note 14, at 243–46 (claiming that the L3C does not protect foundations 
making a PRI and challenging the proposed L3C tranche investment plan); J. William Callison & 
Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not 
Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. 
REV. 273, 274–75 (2010) (challenging the optimism of the L3C proponents); David S. Chernoff, 
L3Cs: Less than Meets the Eye, 21 TAX’N EXEMPTS, May/June 2010, at 3, 4–5 (dispelling six 
myths about the L3C); Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New 
Clothes” on the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 879 (2010) 
(claiming that a number of “glowing characterizations [of the L3C] are each flatly wrong”). 
 19.  See generally Cassady V. (“Cass”) Brewer, Seven Ways to Strengthen and Improve the 
L3C, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 329 (2013); J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with 
Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited 
Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2011).  
 20.  Here’s the Latest L3C Tally, supra note 5.  Rhode Island passed the most recent L3C 
statute.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-76 (1999 & Supp. 2014) (effective July 1, 2012). 
 21.  See infra Appendix A. 
 22.  See Brewer, supra note 6. 
 23.  A review of the L3C list compiled by interSector Partners, L3C reveals almost no 
recognizable companies and a number of companies that are not even large enough to afford or 
desire a website.  Here’s the Latest L3C Tally, supra note 5. 
 24.  Act effective October 1, 2010, 2010 Md. Laws Ch. 97, § 1 (S.B. 690) (current version at 
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01 (West 2014)). 
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separate Section.25 B Lab, a non-profit organization, which has been 
privately certifying companies as “certified B corporations” since June of 
2007, has been a major force behind the passing of benefit corporation 
statutes.26  Many proponents of the benefit corporation form have authored 
or contributed to a white paper entitled The Need and Rationale for the 
Benefit Corporation (“Proponent White Paper”).27  Major arguments made 
in the Proponent White Paper and the responses by skeptics are summarized 
in this Section. 
The authors of the Proponent White Paper claim that the market 
(including consumers, investors, and social entrepreneurs) is demanding a 
society-focused, for-profit entity form like the benefit corporation.28  
Skeptics note that relatively few people have taken advantage of the 
existing social enterprise forms, such as benefit corporations.29  Only 
approximately 1000 benefit corporations were formed in the first four years 
of the statute’s existence, suggesting the market demand may be less than 
was claimed.30  For comparison, Delaware is home to over one million 
entities, and in 2007 an average of 430 LLCs were formed every weekday 
in Delaware.31  In 2014 alone, over 169,000 total entities were formed in 
Delaware, so approximately 1000 benefit corporations (spread over many 
                                                          
 25.  State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., 
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Sept. 20, 2015); see infra Part 
I.D. 
 26.  Our History, BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-
non-profit-behind-b-corps/our-history (last visited Nov. 18, 2015) (stating that the first full-time 
work at B Lab commenced on July 5, 2006 and the first B Corps were certified on June 8, 2007).  
 27.  William H. Clark, Jr. & Larry Vranka, White Paper: The Need and Rationale for the 
Benefit Corporation: Why It Is the Legal Form That Best Addresses the Needs of Social 
Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public, BENEFIT CORP. (Jan. 18, 2013), 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Benefit%20Corporation%20White%20Paper.p
df. 
 28.  Id. at 2–6. 
 29.  J. William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation, and Statutory Design, 26 REGENT 
U. L. REV. 143, 165 (2013); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of 
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 623 (2011). 
 30.  Kate Cooney, Justin Koushyar, Matthew Lee & J. Haskell Murray, Benefit Corporation 
and L3C Adoption: A Survey, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://ssir.org/articles/entry/benefit_corporation_and_l3c_adoption_a_survey.  Currently, there are 
roughly 1400 “certified B corporations” in existence, but benefit corporations are not required to 
be certified, and the certified B corporations, oddly, include partnerships, LLCs, and traditional 
corporations, in addition to benefit corporations.  Certified B Corporations, BCORPORATION.NET, 
http://www.bcorporation.net/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).  During the publication process, the 
number of benefit corporations has risen significantly though this new total number is still 
insignificant in face of the total number of businesses in Delaware and elsewhere in the United 
States.  Appendix A.  
 31.  Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility 
and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 201 (2011) (discussing how formation of LLCs 
significantly outpaced incorporations in Delaware).  
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states) is a small drop in a big bucket.32  Proponents of the benefit 
corporation form counter by noting that the first statute was passed just a 
few years ago, that awareness of the benefit corporation is still spreading, 
and that the number of benefit corporations is growing.33 
The Proponent White Paper’s authors also argue that existing case law 
hinders socially focused for-profit entities, citing iconic corporate law cases 
like Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,34 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,35 
Revlon Inc., v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,36 and eBay Domestic 
Holdings v. Newmark.37  The benefit corporation movement has been 
spurred, in part, by statements by the current Chief Justice of the Delaware 
Supreme Court, Leo Strine, including the statement that “as a matter of 
corporate law, the object of the corporation is to produce profits for the 
stockholders[;] . . .  the social beliefs of the managers, no more than their 
own financial interests, cannot be their end in managing the corporation.”38 
Also, former Delaware Chancellor William Chandler wrote in eBay v. 
Newmark  that “[h]aving chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist 
directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany 
that form.  Those standards include acting to promote the value of the 
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”39  Some critical 
commentators have noted that existing law already provides potential 
solutions for social entrepreneurs, including (1) using the flexible, contract-
based LLC form, (2) incorporating in one of the more than thirty states with 
a constituency statute, and (3) incorporating in a state like Oregon, which 
                                                          
 32.  Jeff Mordock, Delaware Sets Record for New Businesses, DELAWAREONLINE (Jan. 6, 
2015), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/business/2015/01/06/delaware-sets-record-
new-businesses/21366135/ (noting that the roughly 169,000 new businesses formed in Delaware 
in 2014 set a new record, breaking the 162,000 mark set in 2007). 
 33.  See, e.g., Interview with William H. Clark, Jr., Corporate & Securities Partner at Drinker 
Biddle & Reath LLP and Drafter of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, in Seattle, WA at 
Seattle Pacific University (Oct. 8, 2014); see also E-mail from William H. Clark, Jr., to J. Haskell 
Murray, Assistant Professor at Belmont University (Jan. 23, 2015, 11:46 AM) (on file with 
author) (confirming the conversation and agreeing with the statement attached to this footnote); 
FAQ: General Questions, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/faq (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) 
(noting that the first benefit corporation law was passed in 2010 and citing “Method, Plum 
Organics, King Arthur Flour, Patagonia, Solberg Manufacturing, and Rasmussen Colleges” as 
some well-known benefit corporations). 
 34.  Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 35.  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 956 (Del. 1985). 
 36.  Revlon Inc., v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 37.  eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010); Clark & 
Vranka, supra note 27, at 7–13. 
 38.  Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations 
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 151 (2012). 
 39.  eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc,. 16 A.3d at 34.  Professor Lyman Johnson has questioned 
the eBay decision and noted the lack of citation to authority for the court’s statement about the 
need to focus on shareholder profits.  Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate 
Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 274–75 (2013).  
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expressly allows corporations to adopt a social or environmental purpose.40  
Certain academics have argued that social entrepreneurs could avoid the 
holdings of the cases cited in the Proponent White Paper by incorporating 
in more stakeholder-friendly states, and even in the states where the cited 
cases control the business judgment rule provides significant protection for 
social entrepreneurs.41  Other commentators contend that even if benefit 
corporations are not technically needed, this new entity form might serve as 
a useful signaling device.42 
The centerpiece of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation is its 
purpose clause, which states that each benefit corporation must pursue a 
“general public benefit,” defined as “[a] material positive impact on society 
and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party 
standard, from the business and operations of a benefit corporation.”43  In 
previous work, this author has claimed that the “general public benefit” 
concept is too vague, provides insufficient guidance to directors when they 
face zero-sum games, and should be supplemented to require the 
prioritization of the interests, or at least the identification of the benefit 
corporation’s primary interest.44  Other commentators have suggested that 
the “general public benefit” mandate is too broad, and statutes should be 
made flexible enough to allow social entrepreneurs to focus on one or more 
narrow social or environmental issues without being forced to consider all 
stakeholders.45 
Proponents of the benefit corporation form claim that the benefit 
corporation law provides a higher level of accountability and transparency 
                                                          
 40.  Cassady V. (“Cass”) Brewer, A Novel Approach to Using LLCs for Quasi-Charitable 
Endeavors (A/K/A “Social Enterprise”), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 678, 685–86 (2012) (noting 
that the LLC entity form can be used for social enterprise purposes); J. Haskell Murray, Choose 
Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2012) (discussing the legal solutions, outside of social enterprise law, for 
social entrepreneurs); cf. Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate 
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1036 (2013) (noting, with approval, that some critics of social 
enterprise have argued that the existing corporate law is sufficient for social entrepreneurs, but 
stating that a purpose of the benefit corporation law is not just to allow socially focused behavior, 
but to mandate socially focused behavior). 
 41.  Johnson, supra note 39, at 273–78; Loewenstein, supra note 40, at 1008 n.3; Murray, 
supra note 40, at 16–17.  
 42.  J. Haskell Murray, Defending Patagonia: Mergers and Acquisitions with Benefit 
Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485, 505–07 (2013); Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social 
Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767 (2015).  
 43.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 102, 201(a) (2014), 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf. 
 44.  Murray, supra note 40, at 5. 
 45.  J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit 
Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2 
AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 98–104 (2012) (calling the inflexibility of the Model Benefit Corporation 
Legislation the “Illiberalism Problem”); Loewenstein, supra note 40, at 1014–15 (claiming the 
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation is overly rigid because it would not allow an entity to 
focus on only one set of stakeholders).   
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than traditional corporate law.46  Proponents argue that accountability is 
increased by statutory language requiring directors to consider the interests 
of various corporate stakeholders, mandating a corporate purpose to benefit 
society and the environment, and providing benefit enforcement 
proceedings for resolution of complaints related to alleged violations of the 
benefit corporation statute.47  Transparency is increased, proponents argue, 
by the benefit corporation statutes requiring an annual benefit report and 
requiring the measurement of general public benefit against a 
“comprehensive, credible, independent and transparent”48 third-party 
standard.49 
Various authors have called into question the alleged strength of these 
so-called accountability and transparency measures in the benefit 
corporation law.50  For example, some commentators have noted that only 
shareholders, and not the other stakeholders, have standing to bring a 
benefit enforcement proceeding.51  Shareholders may not have significant 
incentives to keep directors accountable to other stakeholders, especially 
when doing so reduces the shareholders’ financial returns.52  Delaware 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine has criticized benefit corporation 
law, writing that “[benefit corporations exist in] a fictional land where you 
can take other people’s money, use it as you wish, and ignore the best 
interests of those with the only right to vote.”53  Some academic articles 
have suggested statutory amendments to provide more serious 
accountability, including imposing a charitable giving floor, adding a 
partial-asset lock, instituting stakeholder standing, and regulating the third-
party standard providers that currently vary wildly in quality.54  At least one 
author has noted that benefit enforcement proceedings may be used by 
                                                          
 46.  Clark & Vranka, supra note 27, at 15–21. 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining 
the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 846 (2012).  
 49.  Id. at 842–50 (paying particular attention to the importance of a third-party standard); 
Clark & Vranka, supra note 27.  Bill Clark and Lizzie Babson have done legal work for the 
primary third-party standard provider, B Lab.   
 50.  Callison, supra note 45, at 90–92, 109–111 (discussing the influence of B Lab in passing 
what he considers unwise legislation and noting the possible use of benefit corporations to 
greenwash given that the area is largely unregulated); see also David Groshoff, 
Contrepreneurship? Examining Social Enterprise Legislation’s Feel-Good Governance 
Giveaways, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 233, 262 (2013) (noting the weakness of the benefit corporation’s 
primary enforcement mechanism—the benefit enforcement proceeding). 
 51.  Murray, supra note 40, at 16–17; Reiser, supra note 29, at 613–14. 
 52.  See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”? 4 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 235, 250–52 (2014) (questioning whether a shareholder will be motivated to protect 
other stakeholders).  
 53.  Strine, Jr., supra note 38, at 150. 
 54.  J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation 
Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 363 (2014); Murray, supra note 40, at 22; Murray, supra note 
42, at 507–11.  
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shareholders to “greenmail” benefit corporations into buying off those 
particular shareholders, possibly to the detriment of the corporation, its 
mission, and the other stakeholders.55  On the transparency front, authors 
have noted that the statutory requirements involving benefit reports are 
extremely vague, susceptible to white- and green-washing, and generally 
lack an express enforcement mechanism for punishing benefit corporations 
that do not provide the reports.56  A few commentators have suggested that 
financial tools, and the private market in general, may be more effective 
than statutes in providing accountability and transparency.57 
Currently, Maryland and Oregon provide for the formation of benefit 
LLCs.58  The existing benefit LLC statutes are nearly identical to the 
benefit corporation statutes, but the benefit LLC law relies on the state LLC 
statute, instead of the state corporation statute, to fill in the gaps.59  Most 
proponents of the benefit corporation statutes, including B Lab, claim that 
they are not encouraging the passage of benefit LLC legislation at this time 
because they believe the traditional LLC law to be flexible enough to 
address the needs of social entrepreneurs who are not interested in the 
corporate form.60  Other proponents, however, believe that the benefit LLC 
                                                          
 55.  See Callison, supra note 45, at 109–11 (arguing that benefit enforcement proceedings 
may be used improperly by plaintiffs simply looking to extract funds from benefit corporations or 
for “adherence to their idiosyncratic conception of the good”).  The term “greenmail” is often 
used in the hostile takeover situation when a corporation pays “a firm or individual in exchange 
for an agreement not to proceed with a tender offer,” but “greenmail” can also be used more 
generally, as Callison uses the term, to refer to payments for not proceeding with other actions 
related to the corporation.  Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of 
Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13, 14 n.1 (1985); see also Callison, supra note 45, at 109–
11. 
 56.  Callison, supra note 45, at 109–10; Murray, supra note 40, at 42–43.  Greenwashing can 
be defined as making false or exaggerated claims about the environmental friendliness of a 
product, company, or industry.  Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient 
Corporate Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 133–34 
(2009).  Greenwashing, however, does not have one agreed upon definition.  Miriam A. Cherry, 
The Law and Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing, 14 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L. J. 281, 295 (2014).  Greenwashing is “when a company tries to portray itself as more 
environmentally minded than it actually is.”  David Gelles, Social Responsibility That Rubs Right 
Off, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/18/business/energy-
environment/social-responsibility-that-rubs-right-off.html?_r=0.  “[A]s a conceptual matter, a 
whitewash has three essential components: an underlying defect, an attempt to conceal the defect 
by diverting attention, and a failure to fix the underlying defect.”  Lesley Wexler, Extralegal 
Whitewashes, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 825 (2013). 
 57.  Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with Fly Paper: A Hybrid 
Financial Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495 (2013); see also Murray, supra 
note 40, at 45–46. 
 58.  MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 4a-1201–1208 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 60.750-60.770 (2014). 
 59.  See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 4a-1201–1208; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 60.750–
60.770. 
 60.  See Murray, supra note 40, at 23 n.101 (citing Telephone Interview with William H. 
Clark, Jr., Partner, Drinker Biddle & Reath and primary draftsperson for the Model Benefit 
Corporation Legislation (Jan. 23, 2012)). 
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is a useful form because many small businesses prefer the LLC framework, 
while also desiring the branding and signaling provided by a “benefit” 
entity form.61 
C. Social Purpose Corporations 
Two states, California and Washington, have passed more flexible 
social enterprise statutes that resist some of the mandatory provisions of the 
benefit corporation statutes, such as the required “general public benefit 
purpose.”62 Unlike the Model-based benefit corporation statutes, these 
social purpose corporations (“SPC”) statutes do not require a general public 
benefit purpose but do require adoption of one or more specific purposes.63  
While the Model-based benefit corporation statutes require pursuit of a 
“general public purpose” and require benefit corporation directors to 
consider the interests of all stakeholders, the SPC statutes allow focus on a 
narrower group of stakeholders.64 
The SPC statutes also expressly provide for dissenters’ rights, the 
payment of fair value for the shares of shareholders who object to 
conversion to an SPC from a more traditional entity form.65  Dissenters’ 
rights have been included in a few benefit corporation statutes, including 
California’s, but are not included in the statutes that follow the Model 
Benefit Corporation Legislation.66  Bill Clark, the primary drafter of the 
benefit corporation legislation, has argued that dissenters’ rights might 
harm cash-poor corporations that wish to convert, but do not have the 
resources to pay the shareholders who do not want to make the change to a 
social enterprise form.67 
                                                          
 61.  Telephone Interview with James Woulfe, Public Policy and Impact Investing Specialist 
at the Social Enterprise Trust (Jan. 29, 2015).  Mr. Woulfe was involved in the Connecticut 
benefit corporation efforts and is considering supporting the passage of benefit LLC legislation in 
Connecticut.  Id. 
 62.  Rob R. Carlson & Lisa M. Tran, California Creates Two New Types of Corporations: 
Understanding the Benefit Corporation and Flexible Purpose Corporation, STAY CURRENT: A 
CLIENT ALERT FROM PAUL HASTINGS (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/2137.pdf.  See generally What Are SPCs?, 
SOCIAL PURPOSE CORP., http://www.spcwa.com/what-are-spcs/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). 
 63.  CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–2517, 2600–2605, 2700–2702, 2800, 2900, 3000–3002, 
3100, 3200–3203, 3300–3306, 3400–3401, 3500–3503 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 23B.25.005–150 (West 2013).   
 64.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 3305 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23B.25.020–030 
(West 2013).   
 65.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b) (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.120 (West 
2013); Antony Page, New Corporate Forms and Green Business, 37 WM. & MARY ENVT’L L. & 
POL’Y REV. 347, 357 (2013).   
 66.  J. Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes 
(Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished chart), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988556. 
 67.  Clark & Vranka, supra note 27. 
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Supporters of benefit corporation statutes have stated that the SPC 
statutes are too weak to support the dual mission of social entrepreneurs.68  
Benefit corporation proponents worry that SPCs might harm society by 
focusing on a narrow set of interests, for example, caring for the 
environment, while treating their employees poorly.69  Critics of the benefit 
corporation framework respond that the benefit corporation statute has 
overpromised, will suffocate companies with its mandatory provisions, and 
has not provided the means to live up to its bold claims of achieving both 
profit and broad purpose.70 
D.  Public Benefit Corporations 
In 2013, Delaware, the leader in U.S. corporate law, entered the social 
enterprise law scene with its own statutory innovation: the public benefit 
corporation (“PBC”).71  B Lab places Delaware’s PBC statute under the 
benefit corporation umbrella, but the Delaware statute differs from the 
Model statute in a number of ways.72  Colorado and Minnesota have 
already adopted large parts of Delaware’s PBC statute, and other states are 
considering using portions of, or the entirety of, Delaware’s framework.73  
The Delaware statute is more permissive than the Model Benefit 
Corporation Legislation in most areas, but has more mandatory provisions 
in the corporate purpose area than the SPC statutes.74  In language broader 
than that in the SPC statutes, a Delaware PBC “is a for-profit 
corporation . . . intended to produce a public benefit or public benefits and 
                                                          
 68.  See, e.g., Derek Ridgway, Flexible Purpose Corporation vs. Benefit Corporation, 
HANSONBRIDGETT (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.hansonbridgett.com/Publications/articles/2012-
09-flexible-purpose.aspx (calling the FPC “watered down” and opining that the FPC “will 
undoubtedly become more susceptible to ‘greenwashing,’ which may in turn erode the underlying 
purpose and benefits of the entity over time”); Clark & Vranka, supra note 27, at app. C, 4–9 
(stating that the FPC law lacks the accountability and transparency of the benefit corporation law).   
 69.  Clark & Vranka, supra note 27, at 8. 
 70.  See, e.g., Callison, supra note 45, at 113–14; Loewenstein, supra note 40, at 1036–37.   
 71.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2011 & Supp. 2015); see also Murray, supra note 
54, at 350–64 (providing a brief history of the public benefit corporation in Delaware and 
comparing the Delaware legislation to the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation). 
 72.  Murray, supra note 54, at 350 (noting the process, B Lab’s involvement, and the opinion 
of certain B Lab employees regarding the passage of the public benefit corporation law in 
Delaware); Governor Markell Signs Public Benefit Corporation Legislation, DELAWARE.GOV 
(July 17, 2013), http://news.delaware.gov/2013/07/17/governor-markell-signs-public-benefit-
corporation-legislation/. 
 73.  See generally Callison, supra note 29; Deborah J. Walker, Please Welcome the 
Minnesota Public Benefit Corporation, U. ST. THOMAS L.J. (forthcoming), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2408241. 
 74.  Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2011 & Supp. 2015), with MODEL 
BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. (2014), 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf; see also 
Murray, supra note 54, at 369–70 (comparing major provisions of the Delaware Public Benefit 
Corporation Law with the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation).   
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to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner.”75  The Delaware PBC 
statute also requires PBCs to choose a specific purpose and to “manage or 
direct the business and affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner 
that balances [1] the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, [2] the best 
interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and [3] 
the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of 
incorporation.”76  The Delaware law only requires a benefit report every 
two years, instead of the annual requirement under the Model Benefit 
Corporation Legislation, and the Delaware PBC law does not require the 
report to be publicly posted.77  Further, the Delaware law allows, but does 
not require, a Benefit Director or use of a third-party standard.  In short, 
Delaware’s PBC law mostly pushes the Model’s benefit corporation 
framework toward increased private ordering.78 
The Colorado statute largely followed the Delaware PBC law, but 
Colorado has reporting requirements that more closely follow the Model.79  
The Corporate Laws Drafting Committee under the Colorado Bar 
Association (“CBA”) first attempted to pass a law that would allow firms to 
choose a general public benefit, a specific public benefit, or both.80  The 
CBA then attempted to pass a law that mirrored Delaware in all areas.81  
The CBA reportedly faced opposition from B Lab and its supporters on 
both attempts; eventually Colorado passed a compromise PBC law that 
followed Delaware in most areas except for the reporting requirements.82  
The Minnesota PBC law, effective January 1, 2015, allows the formation of 
two types of entities: general benefit corporations and specific benefit 
corporations.83  The general benefit corporation is akin to the Model-type 
benefit corporation and the specific benefit corporation is similar to the 
SPC.84 
                                                          
 75.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2011 & Supp. 2015). 
 76.  Id. § 365(a) (emphasis added); see also Murray, supra note 54, at 355 n.64 (discussing 
the debate on the choice to use the word “balance” in the Delaware PBC law and the word 
“consider” in the Model Benefit Corporation legislation in relation to the director duties toward 
stakeholder interests).   
 77.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2011 & Supp. 2015). 
 78.  Murray, supra note 54, at 351–54. Private ordering has been defined as “self-regulation 
voluntarily undertaken by private parties.” Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The 
Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 376 
(2005). 
 79.  Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr., The Long and Winding Road to Public Benefit Corporations in 
Colorado, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2014, at 40, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2266654 (last visited Sept. 20, 2015). 
 80.  Callison, supra note 29, at 159–60.   
 81.  Id. at 163. 
 82.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-101-501–509 (West 2006 Supp. 2014); Callison, supra 
note 29, at 159–64.  
 83.  Walker, supra note 73, at 2, 17. 
 84.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A (West 2011 & Supp. 2015). 
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The PBC laws are quite recent, so relatively little legal scholarship has 
been published on this specific entity type as of the publication of this 
Article.  The academic articles that have been written have largely 
considered the PBC form to be an improvement on most of the existing 
social enterprise laws.85  The same articles, however, have noted various 
issues with the PBC laws, including continued lack of clarity for directors 
and the seeming lack of effective enforcement mechanisms.86 
II.  ITERATIONS AND INNOVATIONS IN SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW 
As Part I demonstrates, states have passed a variety of social enterprise 
statutes and social enterprise law has drawn out conflicting views in the 
literature.  Social enterprise law has evolved over time, sometimes due to 
the passage of a statute that creates a new entity type and sometimes due to 
the passage of a statute that simply modifies an existing entity type.  As 
described in more detail in this Part, social enterprise statutes have evolved 
significantly over time.  The L3C statutes are very thin and have few 
requirements, but they do clearly state that the common good must be the 
primary purpose of the L3C.87  The benefit corporation statutes, along with 
the FPC, SPC, and PBC statutes, are less clear on the priorities of the 
entities than the L3C, but add significant additional detail in other areas.88  
The iterations and innovations involving the social enterprise forms, 
organized by legal issue, are discussed below.89 
A.  Entity Purpose 
Defining entity purpose has been at the heart of many of the social 
enterprise statutes.90  For L3C statutes, the law is clear that “charitable or 
educational purposes” must dominate the “production of income.”91  
Subsequent social enterprise statutes have defined entity purpose, but most 
have not clearly explained how the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders should be prioritized.  For example, the Model Benefit 
                                                          
 85.  See generally Frederick H. Alexander, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Frank R. Martin, & 
Norman M. Monhait, M&A Under Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Statute: A 
Hypothetical Tour, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 255 (2014); Callison, supra note 29; Murray, supra 
note 54; Strine, supra note 52. 
 86.  See supra note 85. 
 87.  See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4161–4163 (2010). 
 88.  Murray, supra note 66. 
 89.  See infra Part II.A–F. 
 90.  See Clark & Vranka, supra note 27, at 15 (stating that defining corporate purpose to 
“create a material positive impact on society and the environment” is one of three major 
provisions in the benefit corporation statutes); see also Elizabeth Schmidt, Vermont’s Social 
Hybrid Pioneers: Early Observations and Questions to Ponder, 35 VT. L. REV. 163, 168 (2010) 
(noting the important social purpose provisions in the L3C statutes). 
 91.  See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 4162 (2010). 
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Corporation Legislation and most states that follow the Model require a 
“general public benefit purpose.”92  Shareholders are included among the 
stakeholders that directors of benefit corporations must consider, but The 
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation does not provide prioritization 
among stakeholders.93  The SPC statutes address what Bill Callison calls 
the “illiberalism problem” created by the broad, mandatory “general public 
[benefit] purpose,” by providing more flexibility in the definition of entity 
purpose.94  The SPC statutes allow an entity’s focus to be on one or more 
specific stakeholders.95  The PBC statutes, initially championed by 
Delaware, stake out middle ground by requiring both a specific public 
benefit purpose and a more general public purpose.96  The SPC and PBC 
statutes, however, do not clearly address the issue of prioritization among 
shareholders and other stakeholders.97 
B.  Third-Party Standards and Social Reporting 
L3C statutes do not require the use of a third-party standard in 
measuring the social impact of an entity.98  Benefit corporation statutes, 
most of which were passed after the L3C statutes, do require use of a third-
party standard, while Delaware’s PBC statute expressly allows, but does not 
require, a third-party standard.99  Colorado’s PBC statute follows the Model 
in requiring a third-party standard, while the SPC statutes do not require 
entities to use a third-party standard to measure social impact.100 
The L3C statutes do not expressly require any social reporting.101  The 
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation and most state benefit corporation 
statutes require annual benefit reports that must be posted on a public 
portion of the firm’s website.102  A few of the benefit corporation statutes, 
                                                          
 92.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 201(a) (2014), 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf. 
 93.  See id. § 301. 
 94.  Callison, supra note 29, at 151–52 (arguing that the “general public purpose” concept is 
overly restrictive and that different corporate actors are likely to have different understandings of 
what is good for society).  
 95.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 3305 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23B.25.020–030 
(West 2013). 
 96.  See DEL. CODE ANN tit. 8, §§ 362, 365 (2011 & Supp. 2015); see also COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 7-101-503, 506 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014). 
 97.  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-101-503, 506 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014); see also 
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–3503 (West 2014). 
 98.  See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4161–4163 (2010). 
 99. Murray, supra note 66; see also Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social 
Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 690–91 (2013) (claiming that the third-party standard 
requirement is a cornerstone requirement of the benefit corporation legislation). 
 100.  Murray, supra note 66. 
 101.  See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3001–3023 (2010) (repeal effective July 1, 2016). 
 102.  Murray, supra note 66.  Forthcoming research by the author will show, however, that 
early benefit corporations have had miserably low compliance rates (under ten percent) with 
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namely Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, and 
New Jersey, create express penalties for failing to provide benefit reports.103  
For example, in New Jersey, if an annual benefit report is not filed for two 
years, then that benefit corporation will lose its benefit corporation status.104  
Most of the state benefit corporation statutes, however, have no express 
enforcement mechanism related to social reporting.105  The California SPC 
statute requires both annual and special reports.106  The Delaware PBC 
statute requires only biennial reports and the report only has to be shared 
with shareholders and not the general public, unless the PBC decides to 
require public disclosure.107  A minority of states, including Arizona, 
Arkansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Utah, require filing the annual 
benefit corporation report with the state.108  While many of these states that 
require filing are also the states that have enforcement mechanisms for 
failing to file a report, some states like Utah, require filing of the benefit 
report with the secretary of state, but do not expressly mention a 
consequence for failing to file.109  Even worse, many of the states neither 
require filing of the benefit report with the state nor do they have any 
effective enforcement mechanism for failing to produce the report on the 
firm’s website.110 
                                                                                                                                      
regard to the social reporting requirements.  See generally, J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on 
Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25 (forthcoming 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2682709.  
 103.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.613 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
156E, § 7 (West 2005 & Supp. 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301 (West 2011 & Supp. 2014); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78B.030(3) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14A:18-11(d)(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-C:13 (LexisNexis 
2014). 
 104.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(d)(2). 
 105.  Murray, supra note 66. 
 106.  CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–2517 (West 2014); see also Reiser & Dean, supra note 57, at 
72–74 (discussing the extensive reporting requirements of the FPC statute). 
 107.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366 (2011 & Supp. 2015); see also Murray, supra note 54, at 
371 (showing the differences between the Delaware PBC law and the Model Benefit Corporation 
Legislation).   
 108.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2442 (2013 & Supp. 2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-401 
(2001 & Supp. 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 16 (West 2005 & Supp. 2015); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 304A.301 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-414 (2012 & Supp. 
2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293- C:13 (LexisNexis 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11 (West 
2003 & Supp. 2015); 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3331 (West 2013 & Supp. 2015); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-500 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10b-402 (LexisNexis 2014). 
 109.  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10b-402. 
 110.  Murray, supra note 66.  This failure to require filing of the benefit report and the failure 
to provide enforcement mechanisms may be oversight or may reflect the reality that many states 
have extremely limited resources and are not willing to invest significantly in benefit corporations 
at this early stage.  
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C.  Dissenters’ Rights 
Neither the L3C statutes nor the Model Benefit Corporation 
Legislation address dissenters’ rights for shareholders who oppose the 
transition to or from social enterprise status.111  The authors of the 
Proponent White Paper argue that dissenters’ rights should not be included 
in social enterprise laws because dissenters’ rights are usually coupled with 
a liquidity event and changing entity types would not provide the liquidity 
needed to pay dissenters.112  This reasoning is not particularly persuasive 
because if converting to a benefit corporation was a prudent strategy, new 
shareholders could be found to buy out any dissenters. 
A number of states have departed from the Model Benefit Corporation 
Legislation and expressly provided for dissenters’ rights.  California’s 
benefit corporation and SPC statutes were the first to expressly address and 
require dissenters’ rights.113  Florida, Minnesota, and Washington 
followed.114  Allowing dissenters’ rights, but only when adopting benefit 
corporation status, not when terminating benefit corporation status, are the 
states of Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Nevada, and 
South Carolina.115   
Going in a different direction, Virginia addresses the issue of a 
potentially unwanted entity conversion by requiring one hundred percent 
shareholder approval for adoption of benefit corporation status, instead of 
the typical two-thirds shareholder vote.116  No known claims for dissenters’ 
rights in the benefit corporation context currently exist.  The mere existence 
of dissenters’ rights in some states, however, may lead to better shareholder 
protection because of the significant financial liability that could be 
triggered if firms convert to (or in some states “from”) a social enterprise 
entity form in the face of significant shareholder opposition. While 
dissenters’ rights may protect shareholders who do not want such a change 
in firm entity type, dissenters’ rights may also open the door to costly 
claims from private company shareholders who are simply looking for 
liquidity. 
                                                          
 111.  See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4161–4163 (2010); Murray, supra note 
66.  
 112.  Clark & Vranka, supra note 27. 
 113.  See Murray, supra note 66. 
 114.  FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.604-605 (West 2007 & Supp. 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 304A.103 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.120 (West 2013) . 
 115.  See Murray, supra note 66. 
 116.  VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-785–786 (2011).  Delaware requires ninety percent shareholder 
approval for a traditional corporation to convert to a public benefit corporation.  DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 363 (2014). 
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D.  Naming and Notification 
One of the often-cited benefits of social enterprise legislation is the 
branding or signaling aspect, but this benefit may be difficult to capture if a 
large percentage of the public are not aware of the company’s social 
enterprise entity selection.117  From a legal standpoint, the Model Benefit 
Corporation Legislation and most benefit corporation state statutes require 
acknowledgment that the firm is a benefit corporation in the articles of 
incorporation, but have largely not required notification of entity type in the 
formal name.118  L3C statutes require that the firm name include the 
abbreviation L3C.119  California (SPC), Colorado (PBC), Delaware (PBC), 
Louisiana (BC), Minnesota (PBC), and Washington (SPC) also require 
designation of the entity type in the firm name.120  Statutes without a 
naming requirement have made it difficult on researchers, and presumably 
interested consumers and government officials, to track these social 
enterprises.  According to Erik Trojian, B Lab’s Director of Policy, the 
naming requirement was not included in the Model because of the 
administrative costs that existing firms would have to shoulder to amend 
various documents related to their name.121  Of course, B Lab’s motivation 
is to make adoption of these forms as easy as possible; state legislatures, 
however, may wish to include a naming requirement, as a number of states 
have, to improve transparency and traceability of these social enterprises.122  
Some states, including California, Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Nevada, and New York, have required notification of the entity 
type on stock certificates.123 
Social enterprise legal entity forms are still not well known in many 
quarters.124  The names of the social enterprise entity forms often include 
words like “benefit,” “social,” or “sustainable,” therefore requiring that the 
entity type be included in the company’s name could aid social enterprises 
                                                          
 117.  Loewenstein, supra note 40, at 1034–35 (discussing the branding challenges that may 
occur if the benefit corporation statutes vary significantly from state to state); Murray, supra note 
54, at 357–58; Yockey, supra note 42, at 812–13. 
 118.  Callison, supra note 45, at 93 (“There are no name requirements, either in the positive 
sense, where benefit corporations must designate themselves as such, or in the negative sense, 
where corporations that are not benefit corporations cannot use a name implying benefit 
corporation status.”); Murray, supra note 54, at 357–58 (discussing some of the difficulties arising 
from the absence of a naming requirement in the benefit corporation statutes); Murray, supra note 
66. 
 119.  See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 4005(a)(2) (2010).  
 120.  Murray, supra note 66. 
 121.  Telephone Interview with Erik Trojian, Dir. of Policy, B Lab (Aug. 15, 2013). 
 122.  Id. (discussing the difficulties some companies might have in switching to the benefit 
corporation form if those companies were required to change their legal name).   
 123.  Murray, supra note 66. 
 124.  Reiser, supra note 29, at 622–24 (claiming that the benefit corporation brand is not yet 
well known in the marketplace). 
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in signaling to managers, employees, customers, and governments the 
social mission of the firms.125  As Professor Joseph Yockey has argued, 
social enterprise laws may serve as focal points and can “direct[] social 
enterprises toward a desired starting point for structuring their behavior.”126  
Even if the social enterprises were well known, Professor Usha Rodrigues 
wonders if social enterprises can send a strong signal to stakeholders given 
their dual focus on public purpose and profit.127 
The names chosen for the hybrid forms—low-profit limited liability 
company, flexible purpose corporation, social purpose corporation, benefit 
corporation, and public benefit corporation—may play a role in entity-norm 
creation and signaling.128  The weakest names, from a social perspective, 
are “low-profit limited liability company” and “flexible purpose 
corporation.”  Recently, each of those forms has attracted less attention, 
perhaps at least partially owing to the entity names, which do not clearly 
state the social purpose of the hybrid form.  The flexible purpose 
corporation name has been abandoned altogether.129  In contrast, the names 
“social purpose corporation,” “benefit corporation,” and “public benefit 
corporation” connote a focus on the society at large.130  The public does not 
generally take the time to dive into the nuances of corporate law, therefore, 
the name of the entity form may be important in the initial shaping of the 
                                                          
 125. Murray, supra note 54, at 505–06; Yockey, supra note 42, at 812 (noting the influence 
entity choice may have on the culture of social enterprises); cf. Robert C. Illig, Oregon’s 
Experiment with Sustainable Corporate Governance: A Friendly Critique, 25 J. ENVTL. L. & 
LITIG. 189, 202 (2010) (“Signaling is a dangerous sport, as one loses control of the signal as soon 
as it is commenced, and it is frequently received either too loudly or not at all.  As a result, signals 
are subject to the twin risks of misinterpretation and misdelivery.”). 
 126.  Yockey, supra note 42, at 808.  
 127.  Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1318–19 (2011). 
 128.  Stronger signals might be sent through more than “mere talk” by states.  For example, tax 
incentives might prove to be a strong signal because in that case states will have made a financial 
sacrifice, at least in the short run, unlike simply passing a social enterprise statute, which requires 
almost no financial support from the state.  See Illig, supra note 125, at 194  (arguing that Oregon 
could send a strong signal to green businesses by “eliminat[ing] the state income tax on any 
profits an organization earns from selling green technologies”); id. at 202; Murray, supra note 42. 
 129.  Alicia Plerhoples, Flexible Purpose Corporations Change Their Name, 
SOCENTLAW.COM (Oct. 20, 2014), http://socentlaw.com/2014/10/flexible-purpose-corporations-
change-their-name/. 
 130.  The positive nature of these names may give rise to reasonable calls for a state 
requirement for socially beneficial activity.  See Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession 
Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 333 (2014) (“Under concession theory, the state retains significant 
presumptive authority to regulate the corporate entity in exchange for granting this bundle of 
rights to incorporators.” (citing Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 
183, 208 (2004))).  But see First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) 
(noting that a concession theory, the theory that “corporations, as creatures of the State, have only 
those rights granted them by the State” was an “extreme position” with regard to traditional 
corporations).  Professor Padfield argues that he is only using “‘concession theory’ to denote a 
theory of the corporation that gives deference to government regulation, as opposed to removing 
all limits on the state’s right to regulate corporations.”  Padfield, supra, at 333. 
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public’s view of the entity.131  Despite the signals sent by the name of the 
forms, the profit-making of these hybrid forms may taint the social identity 
if stronger private or public regulation is not put in place to guard against 
rent-seeking by profit-focused actors.132  In fact, the society-focused name 
might even prove to be a detriment when scandals involving those firms are 
brought to light and the public lashes out against the hypocrisy. 
E.  Legacy Preservation Provisions 
Connecticut cut a new path with its legacy preservation provisions.133  
The legacy preservation provision is an interesting new statutory addition 
that allows benefit corporations in Connecticut the option to “lock in” their 
social mission after a twenty-four-month waiting period and unanimous 
shareholder approval.134  A Connecticut benefit corporation with an adopted 
legacy provision that chooses to merge may only merge with a similar 
benefit corporation with a legacy provision.135  A disposition of assets of a 
Connecticut benefit corporation with an adopted legacy preservation 
provision may only be made to a charitable organization or a benefit 
corporation with a similar legacy preservation provision.136 
This legacy provision may give some confidence to impact investors 
who are looking for assurances that their money will be used for social 
purposes.  The provision may prevent managers of benefit corporations 
from “selling out” when the mission fades or the potential profits from a 
sale increase.  The legacy provision, however, does not ensure that a benefit 
corporation will do any social good, nor does it prevent managers of benefit 
corporations from rent-seeking through excessive salaries and personal 
benefits.  Finally, the legacy provision may be overly restricted, as the 
greatest social good may be achieved by selling the company for a high 
price to a traditional corporation and allowing the benefit corporation’s 
                                                          
 131.  See Illig, supra note 125, at 193 (noting the public’s lack of familiarity with corporate 
law).  
 132.  See MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS: THE NEW KIND OF CAPITALISM 
THAT SERVES HUMANITY’S MOST PRESSING NEEDS 14–31 (2010) (arguing that social businesses 
should be sustainable, but should not be run with shareholders seeking profits because the 
conflicts are too strong).   
 133.  James Woulfe, Woulfe on Connecticut Benefit Corporation Law, BUS. L. PROF BLOG 
(July 18, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/07/woulfe-on-connecticut-
benefit-corporation-law.html.  The Connecticut benefit corporation statute became effective on 
October 1, 2014.  State by State Legislative Status, supra note 25.   
 134.  CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1355 (2005 & Supp. 2015).  The purpose of this waiting 
period is not clear, but it may lead to fewer benefit corporations adopting this provision because it 
may simply vanish from the minds of the managers after the benefit corporation is formed.  The 
statute is not clear regarding whether managers could adopt the provision when the benefit 
corporation is formed, to be effective twenty-four months from formation. 
 135.  Id. § 33-1356(c).  
 136.  Id. § 33-1356(d).  
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shareholders to give to society in their own ways through the proceeds.137  
A better solution to mission drift may be found in a mandatory partial asset 
lock, a minimum charitable contribution rule, or the use of financial 
instruments that encourage a social focus.138  These solutions are not as 
highly restrictive, serve a signaling purpose, and provide a likely social 
benefit.139 
F.  Relatively Stagnant Areas 
Some areas of social enterprise law have remained relatively stagnant.  
For example, most social enterprise laws that have addressed the area have 
provided significant protection to managers.140  Originally, the Model 
Benefit Corporation Legislation did not allow any monetary liability for the 
directors and officers of benefit corporations for “failure of the benefit 
corporation to pursue or create general public benefit or specific public 
benefit.”141  Later versions of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation 
allowed benefit corporations to opt into monetary liability for such a failure 
to pursue or create public benefit.142  The Delaware PBC protects directors, 
as long as their conduct “is both informed and disinterested and not such 
that no person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve.”143 
No social enterprise laws to date have provided automatic standing to 
sue to external stakeholders despite the mandate in the statutes to 
“consider” or “balance” external stakeholder interests.144  In addition, no 
state, other than Connecticut, has done much in the way of locking in a 
mission or providing for serious consequences if the mission is aborted.145  
                                                          
 137.  See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970), 
www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html (arguing 
that businesses should focus on increasing its profits, while staying within “the rules of the game,” 
and leave “social responsibility” to individuals). 
 138.  See generally Murray, supra note 40; Reiser & Dean, supra note 57. 
 139.  While no proposed solution is likely to be without some flaws, a minimum charitable 
contribution (in time or money) would place those contributions into a charitable regime that is 
much more heavily regulated than the for-profit market.   
 140.  Murray, supra note 66. 
 141.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(c)(2) (2014),  
http://benefitcorp.org/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf; Murray, 
supra note 40, at 22 n.98.  
 142.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(c)(2), 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf; Murray, 
supra note 40, at 22 n.98.  There are no indications that any benefit corporations have yet to take 
advantage of the opportunity to opt into allowing the possibility of monetary liability for directors 
or officers who fail to pursue or create public benefit.   
 143.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2015); Delaware Public Benefit 
Corporations: FAQs (on file with author).  
 144.  Murray, supra note 66. 
 145.  Murray, supra note 66; Woulfe, supra note 133; Benefit Corporations Have Arrived in 
Connecticut, MURTHA CULLINA LLP (June 2014), http://www.murthalaw.com/news_alerts/1404-
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Even Connecticut’s legacy protection provisions are optional.146  Most 
states allow the benefit corporations to drop their status with a two-thirds 
shareholder vote.  Since the passage of the first statute, the penalty for L3Cs 
violating the statute has simply been conversion to an LLC; the L3C 
statutes provide neither express penalties in addition to the conversion nor 
any statutory remedy to the L3C members who, after conversion, only hold 
an interest in an LLC.147 
Finally, the general public benefit purpose language and the need of a 
third-party standard appear to be two items that B Lab clings to in their 
promoting of the benefit corporation law.148  Delaware was able to alter the 
general public purpose language and was able to make the third-party 
standard optional.149  Reportedly, B Lab’s response to other states that try 
similar manipulations, especially in regard to the third-party standard 
requirement, is to tell those states, “[you are] not Delaware.”150 
Parts I and II have described what has come into being and what has 
changed in social enterprise law.  Parts III and IV will attempt to describe 
why the evolution of social enterprise law occurred and “how” states may 
proceed in the future. 
III.  JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION OR JURISDICTIONAL POSITIONING 
A.  Race to the Bottom, Race to the Top, or Neither? 
Jurisdictional competition for corporation charters has been heavily 
analyzed and hotly debated in the academic legal literature.151  In 1974, 
William Cary, then a law professor at Columbia University, wrote a 
seminal article in the Yale Law Journal where he argued that Delaware 
corporate law was leading a “race for the bottom.”152  In basic terms, the 
race to the bottom theory posits that states competing for charters have 
enacted management-friendly enabling statutes and “have watered the 
rights of shareholders vis-à-vis management down to a thin gruel.”153  
                                                                                                                                      
may—-benefit-corporations-arrived-connecticut (noting the uniqueness of Connecticut’s legacy 
provisions in its benefit corporation statute).   
 146.  CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1355 (2005 & Supp. 2015).   
 147.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 4163(a) (2010) (“A limited liability company that elects to be 
an L3C and subsequently fails to satisfy any one of the requirements set forth in section 4162 of 
this title shall immediately cease to be a low-profit limited liability company, but by continuing to 
meet all the other requirements of this chapter, continues to exist as a limited liability company.”).  
 148.  Telephone Interview with Erik Trojian, Dir. of Policy, B Lab (Aug. 15, 2013). 
 149.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 362(a), 366 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015). 
 150.  Callison, supra note 29, at 163. 
 151.  See generally Roberta Romano, The Market for Corporate Law Redux, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Francesco Parisi ed.) (forthcoming 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2514650. 
 152.  Cary, supra note 3. 
 153.  Id. at 666. 
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Professor Cary’s seminal article has been cited over 1000 times and a 
popular legal academic blog even bears the title “The Race to the 
Bottom.”154  Additional research has sprouted to support and add to Cary’s 
claims.155 
Others, including Judge Ralph Winter of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, have countered that Delaware has led a “race for the 
top.”156  Proponents of the “race to the top” theory argue that investors will 
prefer firms that do not excessively favor management and that competition 
for charters creates incentives to construct the optimal corporate code.  
Over time, the choice regarding where to incorporate has essentially boiled 
down to two potential states: Delaware and the home state of the firm.157  
As explained by Professor Daines, “Federalism has thus resulted in a series 
of local markets with one national producer, rather than a nationwide ‘race 
to the top/bottom.’”158  Professor Romano mentioned “Delaware’s 
reputation for responsiveness to corporate concerns”159 and “comprehensive 
body of case law, judicial expertise in corporation law, and administrative 
expertise” as reasons for Delaware’s preeminence.160  Some commentators 
claim this “race to the top” versus “race to the bottom” debate is now at a 
stalemate.161 
                                                          
 154.  Westlaw Keycite of William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG, 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
 155.  See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza & Lucian Bebchuk, The Market for Corporate 
Law, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 134, 137, 162 (2006); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma 
Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. 
L. REV. 1775 (2002); Bebchuk, supra note 2; Richard W. Jennings, Federalization of Corporation 
Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 BUS. LAW. 991, 993–94 (1976); Stanley A. Kaplan, Fiduciary 
Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 BUS. LAW. 883, 885–87 (1976).  
 156.  See generally ROMANO, supra note 1; Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm 
Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 527–31 (2001); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in 
Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); Judge Ralph 
Winter, Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
127 (1982); cf. Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1528 (1989) (“I am far more confident that Professor Cary’s argument 
about the race to the bottom is wrong than I am that my argument that Delaware is leading the 
race to the top is right.”).  
 157.  Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1559 
(2002). 
 158.  Id.; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to 
Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 394–402 (2003) (discussing the existence of “home-state 
advantage” in the market for corporate law). 
 159.  ROMANO, supra note 1, at 38. 
 160.  Id. at 39. 
 161.  See, e.g., Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, The Delaware Delusion, 93 N.C. L. 
Rev. 1049, 1059 (2015); Roe supra note 4, at 634.  But see Michael Klausner, Corporations, 
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 842 (1995) (claiming that there 
is “broad consensus” in favor of some form of the “race to the top” theory).   
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More recent scholarship on jurisdictional competition has suggested 
that there is no longer vigorous competition between states for corporate 
charters, though perhaps there had been such competition in the past before 
Delaware became so dominant.162  These commentators argue that 
Delaware’s main competition in the corporate law arena now comes from 
the federal government, rather than from other states, and have posited that 
federal law, not state law through state competition, has accounted for most 
changes in the amount of shareholder protection over the last eighty 
years.163  Professor Romano, however, has argued that Delaware publicly 
expresses more concern about state competition than federal competition, 
and that federal legislation in the corporate law arena is still “rare and 
episodic.”164  Some commentators argue that Delaware has developed 
monopoly-like power for the charters of large out-of-state corporations and 
has held the other states at bay by taking a middle-of-the-road approach, 
balancing appeal to managers and shareholders.165  Other scholars recently 
argued that even if states do not actively compete for out-of-state 
incorporations, they compete defensively to retain corporations located 
within their borders.166  Still others claim that states do not even compete 
defensively because the financial stakes are too low for states other than 
                                                          
 162.  Mark J. Loewenstein, Delaware as Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary’s 
Polemic, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 501–02 (2000); see also Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The 
Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 748–49 (2002) (concluding 
that states, other than Delaware, do not have sufficient financial incentive to compete for 
incorporations); Roe, supra note 4. 
 163.  See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 4, at 604-05; Brian R. Cheffins, Steven A. 
Bank & Harwell Wells, The Race to the Bottom Recalculated: Scoring Corporate Law over Time 
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10, 2014; ECGI-Law, Working Paper No. 
261, 2014; Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 54, 2014; Temple Univ. 
Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 38, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2475242; Roe, supra note 4. 
 164.  Romano, supra note 151, at 46. 
 165.  See e.g., Krešimir Piršl, Trends, Developments, and Mutual Influences Between United 
States Corporate Law(s) and European Community Company Law(s), 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 277, 
315–17 (2008). 
 166.  George W. Dent, Jr., For Optional Federal Incorporation, 35 J. CORP. L. 499, 505 
(2010) (noting that while states do not appear to be competing with Delaware for nationwide 
dominance, there is evidence that states take action, e.g., through statutory amendments, to defend 
themselves against the possibility that their current companies will leave the state); Gordon 
Moodie, Forty Years of Charter Competition: A Race to Protect Directors from Liability? (John. 
M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus. Fellows’ Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 1, 2004), 
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Moodie_1.pdf (showing that 
states that did not react to major statutory innovations, often from Delaware, lost more local 
corporations to other states than those that did); Romano, supra note 2, at 226; Roberta Romano, 
The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 
YALE J. ON REG. 209, 214–36 (2006) (tracking the diffusion of certain corporate law innovations 
across states and claiming that “after Delaware, states that are early to adopt corporate law 
innovations are more likely to succeed in the chartering market by retaining more locally-
domiciled firms”).  
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Delaware.167  These commentators claim that political factors and economic 
barriers prevent states from competing with Delaware.168 
Additionally, some commentators have tried to explain Delaware’s 
sustained success by pointing to Delaware’s expert judiciary and their 
responsive legislature.169  Others have noted the positive network 
externalities produced by having many other companies formed in the same 
state.170  Professors Robert Anderson and Jeffrey Manns use empirical data 
around merger reincorporation to claim that Delaware law does not add 
significant economic value and that the state is dominant simply because 
lawyers are familiar with the state’s law and assume it is superior.171  
Professors Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried, and Daran Ibrahim contend that 
Delaware is dominant, at least in part, because its law serves as “lingua 
franca” for investors across the country.172 
B.  Indeterminacy and Price Discrimination 
Professor Ehud Kamar has argued that the indeterminacy of 
Delaware’s corporate law prevents other states from benefiting from 
Delaware’s positive learning and network externalities and increases 
Delaware’s market power.173  Professor Kamar with Professor Marcel 
Kahan has stated that Delaware uses its significant market power to 
increase its profits through price discrimination; currently Delaware enjoys 
                                                          
 167.  Kahan & Kamar, supra note 162, at 699–700 (arguing that the financial incentives for 
states to engage in defensive competition are extremely weak because of the minimal amounts 
collected from franchise tax revenue and legal business).  Kahan and Kamar appear open, 
however, to the possibility that the benefits to local lawyers may play a role, albeit a minor role, in 
states attempting to retain locally incorporated businesses.  Id. 
 168.  Id. at 724–35 (claiming the economic entry barriers are created by Delaware’s expert and 
well-paid judges, Delaware’s well-known corporate law, and Delaware’s reputation).  The authors 
also claim that the political factors deterring competition with Delaware include the relatively 
small size and delay of profits from incorporation competition, focus on other priorities, and 
opposition of local interest groups.  Id.; see also, Marcel Kahan, The State of State Competition 
for Incorporations (NYU Law and Economics Research Paper, No. 14-19, August 2014), 
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 169.  Romano, supra note 151, at 52–55. 
 170.  Klausner, supra note 161, at 844–47 (claiming that the value of a corporation’s charter 
increases along with increases in the number of firms formed in the state).  Klausner argues that 
legal services and judicial precedent are likely to improve with a larger network and that once 
Delaware took a commanding lead, there was a self-reinforcing dynamic that helped the state 
maintain and even extend its lead.  Id.  
 171.  Anderson & Manns, supra note 161. 
 172.  Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried & Darian Ibrahim, Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: 
Theory and Evidence, 57 J. L. & ECON. 865 (2014). 
 173.  Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998). Legal indeterminacy creates uncertainty stemming from broad 
standards that provide for significant judicial discretion.  Id.  at 1913–15.   
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the ability to charge large firms a premium for incorporation, up to 
$180,000 per year.174  Professor Moshen Manesh has claimed that Delaware 
does not have the same market power with LLCs because of, among other 
things, the contractibility and reduction of legal indeterminacy in LLC 
law.175  Despite the apparent lack of ability to price discriminate in the LLC 
market, professors Bruce Kobayashi and Larry Ribstein concluded that 
Delaware has won the competition for LLCs for many of the same reasons 
Delaware has won the competition for corporate charters, and that most 
other states seem more interested in retaining local LLCs than fighting for 
LLCs from outside their state.176 
Benefit corporation statutes provide, potentially, even more room for 
judicial intervention as they currently mandate a plethora of interests that 
directors of benefit corporations must consider.  As mentioned above, the 
benefit corporation must serve a general public benefit purpose, defined as: 
“[a] material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a 
whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and 
operations of a benefit corporation.”177  Almost each word in this key 
definition could use judicial interpretation.  Further, benefit corporation 
statutes do not allow contracting around or out of the “general public 
benefit purpose” which takes the issue out of the hands private parties and 
leaves significant questions for the courts to answer.178  On the other hand, 
benefit corporation statutes provide significant protection to managers, 
which means plaintiffs’ attorneys may not find lawsuits worth bringing, 
especially if most benefit corporations remain small and unable to pay any 
large damage awards.179  Also, currently, most of the benefit corporations 
formed are small entities and incapable or unwilling to pay large 
                                                          
 174.  See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate 
Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1210–14, 1229 (2001) (discussing the evidence and sources of 
Delaware’s market power); Corporate and UCC Fee Information: Franchise Tax Calculator, 
STATE OF DELAWARE, https://corp.delaware.gov/fee.shtml (noting the maximum fee of $180,000 
a year) (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 
 175.  See Manesh, supra note 31, at 220–41 (explaining that Delaware’s network and judicial 
advantages are diminished in the LLC context). 
 176.  Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 2, at 136 (concluding that the quality of the courts is a 
major factor in attracting LLCs to Delaware and noting that most substantive provisions do not 
appear to have a significant impact in the LLC market).  
 177.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (2014), 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf. 
 178.  Callison, supra note 45; J. Haskell Murray, supra note 40. 
 179.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 301(c), 303(c), 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf 
(protecting directors and officers, respectively, from monetary damages stemming from the 
directors’ and officers’ action or inaction (as long as acting in compliance with general business 
duties and the benefit corporation statute) or “failure of the benefit corporation to pursue or create 
general public benefit or specific public benefit”). 
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incorporation fees.180  If benefit corporations become a more popular 
vehicle for large corporations in the future, and if at least one state can 
differentiate its product sufficiently, the indeterminacy in the benefit 
corporation law allows for the possibility of significant price 
discrimination.  The social enterprises built on the LLC base (L3C and 
Benefit LLC), however, tend toward increased contractibility where 
potential market power may not be as strong.181 
C.  Current Financial Stakes and Jurisdictional Positioning 
Appendix A to this Article sets forth the number of benefit 
corporations and L3Cs formed, respectively, in each state as the given 
dates.182  The data collection process for benefit corporations was 
challenging.  Kate Cooney (Yale University), Matthew Lee (INSEAD), 
Justin Koushyar (Emory University), and I collected data over the course of 
more than twelve months.  Many states we contacted did not distinguish 
between traditional corporations and benefit corporations in their 
databases.183  We had to work our way through secretary of states’ offices 
to find someone who even knew what benefit corporations were.  
Generally, once we found a knowledgeable person, we had to request a 
search of their database.  Some states were better organized than others.  
Delaware, along with a few other states like California, had been tracking 
benefit corporations before we called and were able to provide the data 
quickly.184  For the L3C data we relied on the collection efforts of 
interSector Partners, which has been collecting this data consistently.185  
L3Cs are likely a bit easier to track because the statutes generally require 
some form of “L3C” in the entity name, while most benefit corporation 
statutes do not have naming requirements.186 
The best data to date suggests that there is currently very little at stake 
for states in the social enterprise area, with fewer than 5000 social 
enterprises formed nationwide.187  This number is insignificant in the face 
of almost six million corporations and over three million partnerships 
                                                          
 180.  Find a Benefit Corporation, BENEFIT CORPORATION,  
http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-benefit-corp (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).  Most of the 
benefit corporations listed are extremely small and many do not even have company websites.  Id. 
 181.  Manesh, supra note 31, at 211–16. 
 182.  See infra Appendix A.  
 183.  Part of the benefit corporation legislation pitch to states has been that the law will cost 
extremely little to implement.  
 184.  Unfortunately, California notified us that they planned to stop collecting data on our 
behalf, our contact person at the state left his position, and it became difficult to find another 
person knowledgeable about benefit corporations at their Secretary of State’s office. 
 185.  Here’s the Latest L3C Tally, supra note 5. 
 186.  See supra Part II.D. 
 187.  See infra Appendix A. 
 2016]  THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW MARKET 569 
currently in existence.188  The interest in social enterprises would have to 
increase exponentially for any state to make considerable revenue off of 
social enterprise franchise fees.  States like New Jersey, and South Carolina 
have been stuck at single digit numbers of benefit corporations for well 
over twelve months.189  Washington, D.C. also has fewer than ten benefit 
corporations and its first (and, for a time, only) benefit corporation was 
formed with the assistance of the Georgetown Law Center Social Enterprise 
and Nonprofit Clinic.190  Professor Eric Talley found that only sixty benefit 
corporations and fifteen flexible purpose corporations (now called SPCs) 
were formed in the first eight months of the California laws being 
enacted.191  Only 5% of the entities formed were headquartered outside of 
California, suggesting that virtually no revenue was brought in from 
companies outside of the state.192  Currently, there does not appear to be 
vigorous competition for out-of-state social enterprises because so few 
exist, making the potential financial rewards for states negligible. 
If the financial rewards related to social enterprises are currently so 
small, why are states passing social enterprise laws?  One logical 
explanation could be called “jurisdictional positioning.”  Jurisdictional 
positioning could be defined as states making sure that they are in a good 
starting place when the rewards in an area reach a level worth vigorously 
competing to win.  Early movers have a distinct advantage in jurisdictional 
competition due to significant firm migration costs and the time consuming 
gestation of network and learning effects.193  In addition to the potential 
                                                          
 188.  U.S. CENSUS DEP’T, 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 491 (2012) (based on 2008 federal 
tax filings), https://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/business.pdf. 
 189.  See infra Appendix A. 
 190.  Georgetown Law Students Incorporate First Benefit Corporation in D.C., GEO. L. (Nov. 
21, 2013), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/press-releases/georgetown-law-students-
incorporate-benefit-corporation.cfm. 
 191.  Eric L. Talley, Corporate Form and Social Entrepreneurship: A Status Report from 
California (and Beyond) (UC Berkley Public Law Research Paper, No. 2144567, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144567. 
 192.  Id. at 8.  
 193.  See Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World’s Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 1138–39 (2005) (describing Delaware’s first mover advantages in the 
area of traditional corporations).  The growth in the “impact investing” movement, which is 
partially tied to the social enterprise movement, may be one of the things giving states hope of a 
later payday related to social enterprise.  ANTONY BUGG-LEVINE & JED EMERSON, IMPACT 
INVESTING: TRANSFORMING HOW WE MAKE MONEY WHILE MAKING A DIFFERENCE (2011).  
Large investment banks like J.P. Morgan and Credit Suisse are devoting more resources to impact 
investing, which, at least in part, services social enterprise.  See Corporate Responsibility and 
Social Finance, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/Corporate-
Responsibility/social-finance (last visited Sept. 28, 2015); Responsible Investments, CREDIT 
SUISSE, https://perspectives.credit-suisse.com/ch/private-clients/investments/en/our-
products/sustainable-investments/product-range.jsp (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).  Moreover, many 
of the nation’s top business schools have established social enterprise or social innovation 
programs, signaling that the next generation of business leaders may be more interested in social 
businesses.  See, e.g., Social Enterprise, HARV. BUS. SCH., http://www.hbs.edu/socialenterprise/ 
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financial rewards from winning a social enterprise charter competition, 
states could also be interested in the potential positive externalities flowing 
from social enterprises’ focus on society and the environment. 
D.  State Niches and Differentiation from Delaware 
At this point in jurisdictional competition for business entities, most 
states have recognized that they cannot compete with Delaware for 
traditional, large corporations.194  Instead, states have started to find niches 
where they can develop expertise and competitive advantage. 
Nevada has, perhaps, been the most aggressive challenger of 
Delaware, loosening its laws to protect managers (directors and officers) 
even more than Delaware and advertising the benefits of Nevada corporate 
law heavily.195  Nevada also charges a much lower maximum franchise tax 
than Delaware: $180,000 versus $11,100.196  Further, Professors Kobayashi 
and Ribstein argue that Nevada may be lowering the costs to control 
cheating for firms through the adoption of more bright-line rules for 
liability.197  Some authors claim that Nevada is the only state other than 
Delaware to openly compete for corporation charters and attract a 
significant number of out-of-state corporations.198  Nevada, however, seems 
to focus most of its efforts on closely-held entities.199  Closely-held entities 
are a large group of companies, and perhaps should not be called a niche, 
but Nevada seems to be shying away from direct competition with 
Delaware over large public companies, where Delaware is strongest.200   
North Dakota attempted to differentiate itself by making its law 
friendlier to shareholders and focusing on shareholders and shareholder 
                                                                                                                                      
(last visited Sept. 28, 2015); Center for Social Innovation, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS., 
http://csi.gsb.stanford.edu (last visited Sept. 28, 2015); Social Impact, WHARTON, U. OF PA., 
http://socialimpact.wharton.upenn.edu/projects/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2015); Center for the 
Advancement of Social Entrepreneurship, DUKE, THE FUQUA SCH. OF BUS., 
http://www.caseatduke.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2015).  
 194.  See, e.g., Telephone Interview with James Woulfe, Public Policy and Impact Investing 
Specialist at the Social Enterprise Trust (Jan. 29, 2015) (discussing how Connecticut is looking 
for ways to attract types of businesses, such as social enterprises, that may not be Delaware’s 
primary focus). 
 195.  Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free 
Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935, 949–56, 964–65 (2012).  
 196.  Id. at 973–74.  As Professor Barzuza notes, even though Nevada is less expensive than 
Delaware, Nevada charges a maximum initial fee of $30,000 in addition to its maximum annual 
fee of $11,100, which is much more expensive for incorporation than many other states.  Id.  
Corporate and UCC Fee Information: Franchise Tax Calculator, supra note 174. 
 197.  Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Nevada and the Market for Corporate Law, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1165, 1168–69 (2012). 
 198.  Kahan & Kamar, supra note 162, at 716 (citing John G. Edwards, Nevada Joins the 
Company of Top Incorporation States, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Feb. 8, 1998, at 1K). 
 199.  Id. at 716–17; Piršl, supra note 165, at 317.  
 200.  Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 2. 
 2016]  THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW MARKET 571 
activists, rather than managers.201  By most accounts, however, North 
Dakota’s experiment, while an interesting one, failed to attract many out-of-
state corporations.202  Although North Dakota tried a different strategy than 
Delaware, it did not seem to focus on a narrower group of companies like 
most of the other states mentioned in this Section.  This lack of narrow 
focus may have hurt North Dakota. 
Outside of Nevada and North Dakota, numerous other states have 
attempted to chip away at Delaware by focusing on relatively narrow types 
of companies.  These companies are often in complex industries that require 
special expertise, sophisticated laws, and benefit from tax or other favorable 
treatment.  For example, Wyoming and South Dakota have gotten into the 
asset protection and trust race.203  Oregon has attempted to be a leader for 
green companies, even before the current social enterprise law movement 
began in earnest in the United States.204  Connecticut has made a bid for 
financial services companies through tax provisions and other laws.205  
Maryland has attracted a number of regulated investment firms, such as 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (“REITs”).  In 2000, Maryland ranked 
second only to Delaware in the ranking of incorporations of U.S. public 
companies.206  Massachusetts, like Maryland, has gained some traction in 
                                                          
 201.  Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125, 150–51 (2009) 
(explaining North Dakota’s strategy of focusing on a different group of corporate stakeholders, 
namely shareholder activists). 
 202.  Barzuza, supra note 195, at 971.  Barzuza and others mention American Railcar 
Industries, Inc. as one of, if not the only, major corporation to reincorporate in North Dakota.  Id.  
Carl C. Icahn, who had supported the North Dakota legal changes, controlled American Railcar.  
Id.; see also Joshua P. Fershee, The North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act: A Branding 
Initiative Without a (North Dakota) Brand, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1085, 1088–89, 1105 (2008). 
 203.  See Timothy O. Beppler & Christopher M. Reimer, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: A 
Comparison of the Laws of Utah and Wyoming, UTAH B.J., Mar.–Apr. 2010, at 12, 16 (mentioning 
that, unlike some states, Wyoming does not impose income tax on trusts); Clay D. Geittmann, 
Chaos to Comprehension: Estate Planning in Wyoming, WYO. LAW., Dec. 2007, at 18, 20 
(claiming that amendments to Wyoming law in 2007 to allow for self-settled asset protection 
trusts helped make Wyoming extremely competitive in the relatively narrow competition for 
trusts); Christopher M. Reimer, The Undiscovered Country: Wyoming’s Emergence as a Leading 
Trust Situs Jurisdiction, 11 WYO. L. REV. 165, 194–95 (2011) (calling Wyoming a top destination 
for trusts, due, at least in part, to board powers for the settlor). 
 204.  Robert C. Illig, supra note 125, at 189 (dating Oregon’s efforts in the green business area 
to 2007 and attributing at least part of the growth in this industry to an organization called Oregon 
Lawyers for a Sustainable Future); Judd F. Sneirson, Race to the Left: A Legislator’s Guide to 
Greening a Corporate Code, 88 OR. L. REV. 491, 495–502 (2009) (mentioning the growth of 
green or sustainable businesses and noting that Oregon “has already begun efforts to position 
itself as ‘the Delaware of green business’” through amendments to its corporate code). 
 205.  John R. Shaughnessy & Scott E. Sebastian, 2010 Connecticut Tax Law Developments, 85 
CONN. B.J. 71, 80–82 (2011); Richard W. Tomeo, Connecticut Takes Bold Steps in the Taxation 
of Financial Service Companies, 8 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 209, 210 (1998). 
 206.  Professors Kahan and Kamar claim that Maryland’s success in this niche area can be 
traced to the minimal franchise tax and “Maryland’s attraction for investment funds is based on 
the fact that Maryland law contains a number of statutory provisions targeted at investment 
companies, including provisions designed to assure that the investment company satisfies federal 
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the REIT area.207  Massachusetts also appears to compete in the business 
trust and mutual fund areas.208 
Given that some of the rhetoric used by proponents of social enterprise 
has been largely critical of traditional Delaware corporate law, social 
enterprise may be a niche that other states think they can dominate, or at 
least compete on a more even playing field.209  In addition to attempting to 
find a niche in the competition for business entities, another (more cynical) 
explanation of the widespread passage of social enterprise law is based on 
the interest groups involved.  The next Part explores the influence of these 
interest groups on the passage of social enterprise legislation and on the 
social enterprise movement in general.210 
IV.  INTEREST GROUPS AND SKEPTICS 
Interest group theory has significant explanatory power with regard to 
the recent proliferation of social enterprise laws, which skeptics can claim 
are not being passed for the good of the public, but rather for a relatively 
small group that stand to benefit from the laws.  The interest group theory 
of legislation, also called the economic theory of legislation, posits that 
legislation will be bought and sold as a good to the group that values it 
most.211  Under this theory, interest groups use currency consisting of 
                                                                                                                                      
tax requirements, a waiver of the requirement to hold annual meetings of shareholders, and a grant 
of power to the board of an investment company to increase the number of authorized shares 
without shareholder approval.”  Kahan & Kamar, supra note 162, at 721; see also Guhan 
Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the 
“Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1815–16 (2002) 
(noting that virtually all of Maryland’s success in attracting public companies is due to its success 
in attracting REITs); Charles M. Elson, Book Review, 52 BUS. LAW. 1003, 1004 (1997) (reviewing 
NAT’L ASS’N OF REAL ESTATE INV. TRUSTS, THE PUBLIC REIT LEGAL SOURCEBOOK (1995)) 
(commenting on Maryland and Delaware’s relative strength in the REIT area).   
 207.  Daines, supra note 157, at 1572 n.51; Sheldon A. Jones, Laura M. Moret & James M. 
Storey, The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment Companies, 13 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 421, 428–29 (1988) (noting Massachusetts’ competition in the business trust area, in part 
through favorable statutes and case law); William L. Martin II, Federal Regulation of Real Estate 
Investment Trusts: A Legislative Proposal, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 316, 316 n.2 (1978) (noting that 
REITS often form as Massachusetts business trusts). 
 208.  See Diane M. Ring, Exploring the Challenges of Electronic Commerce Taxation Through 
the Experience of Financial Instruments, 51 TAX L. REV. 663, 667 (1996) (describing 
Massachusetts’ strength in the mutual fund industry).  
 209.  TEDx Talks, TEDxPhilly—Jay Coen Gilbert—On Better Businesses, YOUTUBE, at 
9:45–10:02 (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mGnz-w9p5FU (claiming that 
maximizing shareholder value is “the only game in town” in Delaware (citing eBay Domestic 
Holdings v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010)).  See generally Clark & Vranka, supra note 27. 
 210.  See infra Part V.  
 211.  Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227 (1986).  See generally 
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE 
L.J. 31, 35 (1991) (“The defining theme of the interest group theory of lawmaking is its rejection 
of the presumption that the government endeavors to further the public interest.  Rather, under 
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“political support, promises of future favors, outright bribes, and whatever 
else politicians value” to achieve passage of legislation that favors the 
interest groups’ desires.212  Using microeconomic tools, the interest group 
theory claims the price an interest group ultimately pays will be influenced 
                                                                                                                                      
interest group theory, all the participants in the political process act to further their self-interest.”); 
Macey, supra note 193, at 1136–37 (claiming that attorneys are the primary interest group that 
benefits under their theory); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group 
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987) (applying interest group theory 
to Delaware corporate law).  George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political 
Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 240 (2009) (“In very general terms, 
the interest-group theory of the legislative process conceptualizes legislation as carrying out a 
transfer of benefits from one group (typically thought to be large, disorganized, and with diffuse 
interests, such as taxpayers generally) to some other group (small, focused, and easily organized, 
such as persons or firms having some common, special interest.” (first citing DANIEL A. FARBER 
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 23 (1991); then 
citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group 
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975); and then citing George J. Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3–4, 10–11 (1971))).  
 212.  Macey, supra note 211, at 227–28 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The 
Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975)).  Later 
in the article Macey also mentions “investing in congressional retirement funds” and paying 
“honoraria for speaking engagements” as other currency used by interest groups to purchase 
legislative favors.  Id. at 230 (citing G. Easterbrook, What’s Wrong With Congress?, THE 
ATLANTIC, Dec. 1984, at 57, 70–72). Professor Elhauge writes that “interest groups influence the 
political process . . . by paying lawmakers in the form of bribes, speaking fees, supportive 
advertising, campaign contributions, or offers of future employment; by pressuring political 
officials to support or oppose the appointment, promotion, removal, or budget of regulators; and 
by influencing the information that reaches legislators, regulators, and the voting public.”  
Elhauge, supra note 211, at 35–36 (first citing DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL 
CONNECTION 39–41 (1974); then citing Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among 
Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371–72, 392 (1983); then citing Jonathan 
R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation, 86 COLUM. 
L. REV. 223, 230–31 (1986); then citing William Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State 
Regulation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 636 (1987); then citing Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General 
Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213–14 (1976); and then citing George Stigler, The 
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 12 (1971)); see also William 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 
J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975); accord John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 2387, 2410–12 (2003).  Macey claims:  
[S]tatutes generally can be divided into three distinct categories.  The first are those 
designed to advance some public purpose, such as protection of the environment or 
providing for national defense.  Besides these public interest statutes, there are two 
types of special interest statutes—”open-explicit” statutes and “hidden-implicit” 
statutes.  Open-explicit statutes are naked, undisguised wealth transfers to a particular, 
favored group.  By contrast, hidden-implicit statutes are couched in public interest 
terms to avoid the political fallout associated with blatant special interest statutes.   
  Hidden-implicit statutes exist because the political costs of enacting them is lower 
than the political costs of enacting open-explicit statutes.  We observe open-explicit 
statutes because they are less ambiguous and therefore more likely to be enforced in 
precisely the way the relevant interest groups prefer.  As described below, in deciding 
whether to lobby for one type of statute or another, interest groups must make a trade-
off between the higher political costs associated with open-explicit statutes and the 
greater uncertainty associated with hidden-implicit statutes.   
Macey, supra note 211, at 232–33. 
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by the value of the legislation to the group and the costs of organizing the 
coalition.213   
Small and large interest groups each have their advantages and 
challenges.  The legislative benefits are less diluted and coordination is 
easier for smaller interest groups.214  Larger interest groups have 
advantages that include: “(1) more votes, (2) some economies of scale, and 
(3) perhaps more total resources.”215  Interest group resources appear 
important regardless of size, and the success of an interest group may 
depend, in part, on the attributes of any opposing interest groups.  Interest 
groups may thrive in a representative government because information 
costs involving the impact of legislation can be high and transaction costs 
for organizing lobbying groups, while limiting free-riders, may be 
                                                          
 213. Elhauge, supra note 211, at 36–37 (discussing collective action problems); Landes & 
Posner, supra note 212, at 877. 
 214.  Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 266 (1982); see also Elhauge, supra note 211, at 37–40 
(stating that “large diffuse groups face greater collective action obstacles to group petitioning in 
three respects:” (1) “for any given level of aggregate group benefits, large diffuse groups are more 
susceptible to free rider problems because the benefits from seeking or opposing a particular legal 
change must be spread over a larger number of beneficiaries,” (2) “given a particular incentive to 
free ride, a larger group will have a tougher time organizing collective efforts to overcome free 
riding.  Having a large number of members makes it more difficult and costly to identify 
members, reach collective cost-sharing agreements, and monitor and punish free riding.  In small 
groups, free riding will be easier to detect because it has a proportionally larger effect.  Small 
groups also generally have lower organizational costs, and their members are more likely to have 
ongoing personal contact, making monitoring easier and making social sanctions, in particular, 
more effective,” (3) “for any given level of per capita benefit to group members from a legal 
change, a larger group will likely face a smaller opposition that is more motivated because it 
suffers greater per capita costs.  Hence, large groups are not just less effective in their own right; 
they also generally face more effective opposition than small groups. . . .  The confluence of these 
advantages and disadvantages may not benefit small groups per se.  Rather, it may benefit those 
small to medium-sized groups that enjoy optimal combinations of free-riding avoidance, weak 
opposition, voting power, resources, and economies of scale.” (footnote omitted)); Rachel Sachs, 
The New Model of Interest Group Representation in Patent Law, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 344, 349 
(2013–14) (noting the advantages of relatively small interest groups and stating that “legislative 
activity will be dominated by comparatively small interest groups with members who would reap 
a disproportionate share of any legislated benefit, while the costs of such legislation are dispersed 
far more widely” (first citing MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 128 (1965); then citing JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON 
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 292 (1965); and then citing Richard A. Posner, 
Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 
266 (1982))). 
 215.  Elhauge, supra note 211, at 39 (first citing Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General 
Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 214 (1976); then citing George Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 13 (1971); then citing MANCUR OLSON, 
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 47 (2d ed. 1971); then citing Gary S. Becker, A Theory of 
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 380 (1983); then 
citing Peltzman, supra, at 213; Stigler, supra, at 12; then citing RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 45 (1982); and then citing Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCL. 335, 349 (1974)). 
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significant.216  Groups with lower information costs and lower transaction 
costs may be more effective in achieving wealth transfers from groups with 
greater organizational challenges.217 
Interest group theory works well to explain the widespread adoption 
and development of social enterprise law.  While public interest theory 
holds that “the ideal and the actual function of legislation [is] to increase 
economic welfare by correcting market failures,” a shift from the 
“dominant public perception of ‘government as helper’” to distrust and 
focus on private interests appears to be descriptively accurate.218  The 
various interests groups, discussed below, appear to have catalyzed the 
passage of the social enterprise legislation and have made a compelling 
case to legislators.  However, politicians have mixed motives, and a strong 
version of interest group theory, whereby legislation is solely justified by 
interest group preferences and efforts, likely overstates the reality.219 
A.  The Activists 
Social enterprise activists, as used here, are individuals or 
organizations that lobby for the passage of social enterprise law and 
strongly support the social enterprise movement, often with some personal 
and professional motives.  Social enterprise activists are not only influential 
in getting laws passed, but may also serve as evaluators of the various state 
                                                          
 216.  Macey, supra note 211, at 229. 
 217.  Id. at 229–30 (“The major implications of interest group theory are that legislation 
transfers wealth from society as a whole to those discrete, well-organized groups that enjoy 
superior access to the political process, and that government will enact laws that reduce societal 
wealth and economic efficiency in order to benefit these economic groups.  The economic theory 
of legislation does not predict that all laws will enrich the few at the expense of the many, but it 
does predict that this will be the dominant outcome and that there will be a trend in this direction.” 
(citing M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 75–117 (1982))).  
 218.  Macey, supra note 211, at 223; Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading 
of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982) (citing W. BAUMOL, 
WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE (2d ed. 1965) and A. PIGOU, THE 
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932)). 
 219.  Sachs, supra note 214, at 350–51 (citing research showing “that the effect of interest 
group pressure on Congress could ‘range from insignificant to determinative,’ depending on ‘the 
configuration of a large number of factors—among them the nature of the issue, the nature of the 
demand, the structure of political competition, and the distribution of resources.’” (quoting KAY 
LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 317 (1986))).  Later, Sachs notes, “where legislation is ‘applicable to a particular 
industry,’ interest group theory likely has comparatively greater explanatory power.  Ultimately, 
the ‘best picture of the political process’ is one in which ‘constituent interest, special interest 
groups, and ideology all influence legislative conduct.’”  Id. at 351 (first quoting Posner, supra 
note, 218, at 271; then quoting Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public 
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 900–01 (1987); then citing DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 33 (1991); then citing Einer R. 
Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 
43 (1991); and then citing Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional 
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1067–68 (2003)). 
 576 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:541 
laws and may direct entrepreneurs to the states that the activists think have 
better laws.220  As such, state government officials seem to be aware of the 
influential social enterprise activists. 
Bob Lang seems to be the primary social enterprise activist for the 
L3C form, while the nonprofit organization B Lab has been the biggest 
player in the benefit corporation area.221  Bob Lang may not have included 
enough supporters, with sufficient resources, to support the widespread 
adoption of the L3C legislation, and the criticism and constructive 
suggestions for change do not appear to have led to significant amendments 
to the substance of the L3C legislation.222  On the other hand, B Lab 
appears more inclusive and has been able to reach out to a wider range of 
people and amass more resources, even though the core B Lab team has 
remained relatively small.223  While B Lab has not always been successful 
in bringing people in the social enterprise area together, they appear to have 
made a good faith attempt to consider opposing views and have modified 
their model legislation a number of times.224   
                                                          
 220.  Murray, supra note 54, at 350–51 (discussing B Lab’s issues with the Delaware public 
benefit corporation statutes, including that the statutes do not require public posting of the benefit 
report and do not require use of a third party standard); Clark & Vranka, supra note 27, at app. C.  
(discussing the perceived weaknesses of the flexible purpose corporation statute, including that it 
is a “cumbersome” law, that the “special purpose” requirement is not broad or flexible enough, 
and that the statute does not provide the same level of transparency and accountability as the 
benefit corporation statute because of limitations on reporting and the non-requirement of a third-
party standard).  
 221.  AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 
https://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org (last visited June 20, 2015) (compiling 
information about the L3C, including information about Bob Lang, the inspiration of the L3C 
entity form).  Attorney Marc Lane has also been extremely active in the L3C movement.  About 
Our Founder, MARC J. LANE WEALTH GROUP, 
http://www.marcjlane.com/index.php?src=gendocs&ref=AboutOurFounder&category=About 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2015) (calling Marc Lane “the force behind Illinois’ Low-profit Limited 
Liability Company (L3C) legislation” and claiming that he “has been instrumental in promoting 
L3C legislation in other states”). 
 222.  See generally Bishop, supra note 14; Brewer, supra note 19; Callison & Vestal, supra 
note 18; Kleinberger, supra note 18; Murray & Hwang, supra note 19.  To the author’s 
knowledge, none of the suggestions in these articles by respected academics and practitioners 
have been adopted in L3C legislation.  See., e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4001(14), 4161–4163 
(2010).   
 223.  Maribel Morey, The Rockefeller Foundation’s Hand in Hobby Lobby, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV., Aug. 21, 2014, 
http://www.ssireview.org/bl/entry/the_rockefeller_foundations_hand_in_hobby_lobby (noting 
that B Lab was an early recipient of a Rockefeller Foundation grant); Our Team, 
BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-
corps/our-team (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (noting that two of the three B Lab founders previously 
ran “AND1, a $250 million basketball footwear and apparel business” before co-founding B Lab).  
 224.  Callison, supra note 29, at 159 (discussing the heated debates, over more than three 
years, between B Lab and the Corporate Laws Drafting Committee under the Colorado Bar 
Association).  Stanford Psychology Professor Carol Dweck’s description of the differences 
between a growth mindset (learning from criticism) and a fixed mindset (ignoring useful 
feedback) can provide useful advice to all those involved in social enterprise.  See generally 
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These activists are a new feature in the jurisdictional competition 
landscape.  Other entity forms did not seem to have similarly visible, 
organized, and influential champions.  These social enterprise forms are the 
first forms that explicitly mix social purpose and private profit, thus 
attracting supporters who seek success in both areas.  These activists have 
led to more rapid passage of the social enterprise forms than may have 
occurred if the process were more organic.225  While most of the interest 
groups below have been discussed in the jurisdictional competition 
literature, activists like Bob Lang and B Lab seem to be absent.  Both Bob 
Lang and B Lab profit from the existence of social enterprise.  Bob Lang 
provides social enterprise consulting services and B Lab charges social 
enterprises for its certification.226 
Other social enterprise activists like lawyers and additional service 
providers have also entered the fray, albeit with more minor roles.  B Lab 
appears to have exerted significant effort to recruit these supportive 
business people and lawyers.227  Most of these professionals seem hopeful 
of gaining some personal benefits from their newfound expertise in the 
social enterprise law and an entire industry has evolved to advise these new 
social enterprises.228 Consultants, financial services professionals, and 
                                                                                                                                      
CAROL S. DWECK, MINDSET: THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS (2006).  Those with growth 
mindsets, open to change and improvement, are most likely to flourish.  Id.  
 225.  Deborah Sweeney, The Evolution of an Entity: A Closer Look at Benefit Corporations, 
MY CORPORATION (Sept. 9, 2013), http://blog.mycorporation.com/2013/09/the-evolution-of-an-
entity-a-closer-look-at-benefit-corporations-infographic/ (comparing the spread of benefit 
corporation legislation to the spread of LLC legislation).  This infographic is a bit misleading 
because the LLC form spread very quickly once the IRS weighed in on the form, but it took a few 
decades for the IRS to act.  Id.   
 226.  Make it Official, CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS, http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-
corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/make-it-official (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (listing the annual 
certification fee ranges from $500 to $50,000+ based on annual sales).  B Lab is, however, a 
nonprofit corporation and it provides its third-party standard, though not its certification, for free.  
About B Lab, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/about-b-lab (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2010) (noting that the B Impact Assessment is “A Free and Confidential Tool to 
Compare your Company’s Impact.”)  Bob Lang’s Americans for Community Development 
provides a variety of services for L3Cs, and is currently developing certification courses for social 
enterprise advisors. Certification, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 
https://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/certification.html (last visited Sept. 3, 
2015).  
 227.  See, e.g., Clark & Vranka, supra note 27, at 1 (listing drafting authors and some 
supporters of a white paper advocating for the advancement of benefit corporation law). 
 228.  See, e.g., About Us, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L3C, 
http://www.intersectorl3c.com/aboutus.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (stating that their services 
include “Social Enterprise strategy & development”); B CORP ADVISORS, 
http://bcorpadvisors.com (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (explaining that “B Corp Advisors helps 
organizations and executive teams understand, evaluate and implement the legal and business 
dimensions of: Benefit Corporations, Flexible Purpose Corporations, Certified B Corporations, 
Other Sustainable or Hybrid Legal Forms”); BLUE DOT ADVOCATES, http://www.bluedotlaw.com 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (a law firm with a focus on social enterprise and impact investing); 
MARC J. LANE WEALTH GROUP, LOW-PROFIT LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (“L3CS”) 
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lawyers serving the social sector have accounted for a significant portion of 
the social enterprises formed to date.229  While these service providers are 
becoming more of a factor, Bob Lang and B Lab still appear largely in 
control of their respective social enterprise movements. 
B.  The Business Managers 
Managers of business entities make up another interest group that 
appears to be impacting social enterprise law drafting, adoption, and 
implementation.230  These managers may reasonably be concerned not only 
with the success of their businesses, but, more personally, with addressing 
their own potential liability.231  To date, the social enterprise laws have 
generally offered managers significant protection.232  These social 
enterprise laws limit the standing of those who can bring a claim and make 
building a successful claim extremely difficult.233  External stakeholders are 
not expressly given standing to sue in any of the existing social enterprise 
statutes, even though the statutes require consideration of their interests.234  
Further, the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, upon which most state 
benefit corporation statutes are based, provides that directors are not 
personally liable for monetary damages for “failure of the benefit 
corporation to pursue or create general public benefit or specific public 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.marcjlane.com/index.php?submenu=L3C&submenu=Social_Enterprises&src=gendoc
s&ref=L3C&category=Capabilities (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (claiming to be “recognized as a 
national leader in the development of L3Cs”); Our Story, UPSPRING, 
http://upspringassociates.com/who-we-are/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2015) (“We serve the social 
enterprise community with effective and sustainable consulting services”); WESTAWAY LAW, 
http://westawaylaw.com/about (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (“an innovative law firm committed to 
serving the social enterprise sector”). 
 229.  Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting 
In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 263 (2014) (noting that 31% of early Delaware public benefit 
corporations were in professional services, many servicing the social sector). 
 230.  The term “managers,” as used here, refers to the board of directors and/or executive 
officers.  See Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO—Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business 
as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023, 2034–35, 2035 n.29 (2002) (using the term 
“managers” to refer to directors and/or officers). 
 231.  Cf. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1088 n.179 (2000) (discussing the backlash and 
statutory response resulting from Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985) in which the 
directors were held liable for breaching the duty of care). 
 232.  See supra Part II.F (explaining how the significant liability protection for managers has 
been a mainstay in social enterprise legislation).   
 233.  Murrray, supra note 66. 
 234.  See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-440 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-790 (2011).  Most 
benefit corporation statutes, however, do expressly allow benefit corporation managers to choose 
external stakeholders that may have standing.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-440; VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 13.1-790   To date, the author is not aware of any benefit corporation that has granted standing 
to an external stakeholder.  While such a grant of standing is certainly possible, especially for the 
benefit corporations that deeply care about accountability, most social enterprises are unlikely to 
allow another standing to sue and disrupt their business. 
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benefit.”235  Delaware’s PBC law protects director actions if the directors’ 
decisions are informed, disinterested, and not irrational.236  As long as they 
are largely protected from liability, managers of socially conscious firms 
have been generally supportive of social enterprise law, even if their 
companies have not yet made the switch.  B Lab has utilized these 
managers, many of whom are influential in their respective states, as 
supporters, and B Lab has seemingly extended its influence by enlisting 
these significant tax-paying proponents.237 
C.  The Skeptics 
A number of academics and some sophisticated lawyers have 
criticized all or part of the social enterprise laws.238  Some of the critics 
have contributed to the evolution of social enterprise laws, and academics 
such as Daniel Kleinberger and Carter Bishop, along with practitioner Bill 
Callison, played a large role in the apparent stall and decline of the L3C 
form.239  B Lab has attempted to reach out to academics and high-level 
legal practitioners to discuss the Model legislation, but B Lab has also been 
criticized for failing to modify certain controversial provisions of the Model 
legislation.240  As Macey and Miller recognize, lawyers often act as the 
gatekeepers of corporate law but frequently, in the social enterprise context, 
bar association committees are being overruled or pressured into approving 
the laws by other interest groups.241  While some of the skeptics have 
simply criticized without providing any constructive solutions, most of the 
skeptics have offered ways forward and could improve the future of social 
enterprise laws.242 
                                                          
 235.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 102, 301(c)(2) (2014). 
 236.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b) (2011 & Supp. 2015); Delaware Public Benefit 
Corporations: FAQs (on file with author).   
 237.  See State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORPORATION, 
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (listing key 
supporters such as the businesses of Hawthorne Auto Clinic (Oregon), West Paw Design 
(Montana), and Dansko (Pennsylvania). 
 238.  See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, A Skeptic’s View of Benefit Corporations, 1 EMORY CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 17 (2014),  
http://law.emory.edu/ecgar/_documents/volumes/1/1/greenfield.pdf; Kleinberger supra note 18, 
Bishop supra note 18; Callison & Vestal, supra note 18; Murray supra note 40, at 22–24 
(discussing areas of possible improvements for the benefit corporation law); Murray & Hwang, 
supra note 19, at 42–50 (discussing possible improvements for the L3C law). 
 239.  Kleinberger, supra note 18; Bishop supra note 18; Callison & Vestal, supra note 18.   
 240.  Callison, supra note 29, at 161–63 (Bill Callison was an attorney involved in the benefit 
corporation debates and legislative drafting process in Colorado).   
 241.  Id.; Macey & Miller, supra note 211, at 503–506 (discussing the role of the Delaware 
bar). 
 242.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO 
MAKE GROUPS SMARTER 9–13 (arguing against “happy talk” to make people feel better and 
arguing that anxious, critical people can make organizations stronger over time).  
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D.  The Politicians 
Under the interest group theory of legislation, politicians act in their 
own self-interest, for example they may act consistent with their desire to 
be reelected or keep their political party in power.243  “In public choice 
legal scholarship, the role of the legislator has been transformed from that 
of a passive broker to a rent-seeking actor.  A rent-seeking legislator 
strategically uses the threat of negative regulation or the promise of 
favorable regulation to secure interest group payments.”244 
For state politicians, the reasons to support social enterprise laws are 
readily apparent.  Social business is popular; Wall Street and traditional for-
profit corporations are not.245  Even for the pro-market, pro-Wall Street 
politicians, these laws purport to embrace freedom, do not force anyone to 
incorporate under the laws, and expressly deny altering the existing 
corporate laws.  Social enterprise laws allow the market to operate.  The 
statutes appear to appeal to both the social justice advocates on the left and 
to the free market proponents on the right.246  Research has shown that a 
“larger ‘green’ workforce exerts a significant positive influence on Benefit 
Corporation legislation passage,” suggesting that environmentally-friendly 
states are especially interested in social enterprise law.247  Additionally, 
social enterprise laws have been promoted as no cost or low cost to states.  
Currently, there are not state-level tax breaks for the social enterprises and 
not even much in the way of necessary changes at secretary of state’s 
offices, as the social enterprises are often simply included in the LLC or 
corporation framework.  The benefits, therefore, do not have to be large to 
justify passage of these laws in the eyes of politicians.  While a few cities, 
such as San Francisco and Philadelphia, have provided some financial 
benefits to social enterprises, the benefits to date have been quite small.248  
States may attract some businesses to the state and may gain some revenue, 
with negligible costs, or so the pitch goes.  The activists and business 
                                                          
 243.  Nancy J. Knauer, How Charitable Organizations Influence Federal Tax Policy: “Rent-
Seeking” Charities or Virtuous Politicians?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 971, 1034–35 n.326; Elhauge, 
supra note 211. 
 244.  Knauer, supra note 243, at 1036 (first citing Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and 
Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 361 (1988); and then citing Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. 
McChesney, Review Essay, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891, 893 (1987)).  
 245.  OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org/ (detailing a nationwide movement 
against “the ruling class”). 
 246.  Kyle Westaway, Something Republicans and Democrats Can Agree On: Social 
Entrepreneurship, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Apr. 17, 2012),  
http://ssir.org/articles/entry/something_republicans_and_democrats_can_agree_on_social_entrepr
eneurship. 
 247.  Hans Rawhouser, Michael Cummings & Andrew Crane, Benefit Corporation Legislation 
and the Emergence of a Social Hybrid Category, 57 CAL. MGMT. REV. 13, 18 (2015). 
 248.  Murray, supra note 40. 
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managers, mentioned above, are likely vocal, motivated, and influential 
groups, as those groups pay taxes, vote, and have a good bit to gain from 
the legislation.  While the skeptics also pay taxes and vote, they appear to 
have less to gain and fewer resources.  State bar associations have been 
involved, to some extent, in the political process, but they have not been 
significantly involved in every state’s process.249  Occasionally, a state 
politician warms to the social enterprise movement enough to take the 
legislation to a vote with little or no support from the state bar association. 
V.  THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW MARKET 
A.  Leaders and Laggards 
According to the early data, the current leaders in the nascent social 
enterprise market are Delaware, Nevada, Maryland, California, and New 
York.250  It is, however, much too early to crown a winner.  Delaware 
seems to have started relatively strong based on its reputation in corporate 
law.  Nevada has been attempting to challenge Delaware on other fronts 
and is pushing to be a leader in corporate law.  Nevada is in the lead 
currently, but may have been boosted by the inclusion of a benefit 
corporation check box on the state form, which incorporators may or may 
not have fully understood.251  Maryland has done relatively well by virtue 
of being the very first mover; Maryland has a year or more head start on 
most states.  Finally, New York and California have done relatively well, 
probably because they are large states and have more social enterprises 
located in their states that want to use local law.252 
The District of Columbia, New Jersey, and South Carolina have 
lagged; they are all stuck in the single digits of benefit corporations 
formed.253  From the L3C side, Rhode Island, Maine, and Wyoming have 
lagged.254  Excluding New Jersey, these states all have relatively low 
population levels, coupled with a relative lack of corporate law expertise.  
The Delaware experience might suggest that small size is an advantage, but 
the business law expertise to attract out-of-state firms, state population, and 
business formations within the state will likely be correlated.  New Jersey is 
                                                          
 249.  See State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORPORATION, 
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (listing, for example, the Florida Bar 
Association, as a “key supporter” of the benefit corporation legislation). 
 250.  See infra Appendix A.  
 251.  Cooney, Koushyar, Lee & Murray, supra note 30.  
 252.  Cf. Subramanian, supra note 206, at 1814–16 (noting that California is a top home for 
corporate headquarters, but underperforms in the incorporation market if the share of 
headquartered corporations are taken into account; New York, likewise, seems to underperform in 
the incorporation market relative to its headquarter status, which is much stronger).  
 253.  See infra Appendix A. 
 254.  See infra Appendix A. 
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a curious addition to this group; as mentioned, previously it was a leader in 
corporate law, is close to New York City, and has a relatively large 
population itself.  From personal interaction with people in the New Jersey 
Department of State, my working hypothesis is that the relative lack of 
knowledge of social enterprise within that office is limiting the formation of 
benefit corporations in the state.255  However, with only about 1000 entities 
at the number one state, no state has established itself as dominant. 
B.  Attracting Social Enterprises 
The literature dealing with more established entity types suggests that 
states can attract social enterprises by: (1) being an early mover; (2) having 
an expert and responsive legal system; (3) making a credible commitment 
to the desired infrastructure; and (4) engaging the corporate bar.256  
Commentators have also mentioned geographic proximity to major 
financial and political centers as an advantage.257  Surprisingly, one 
argument that apparently has not been made in the scholarly literature is the 
importance of states engaging the legal academy. 
Lessons from the literature can be applied to the social enterprise 
situation, along with the suggested importance of engaging the academy.  
Regarding its being an early mover, Delaware’s experience shows that 
while it is not necessary to be a first mover to eventually dominate a law 
market, it appears that being an early mover is advantageous.258  Being an 
early mover in social enterprise may position states to take the lead in that 
niche area, but those early states must be willing to amend their laws to 
keep up with the developments.259  States wish to be in a good position 
relative to other states regarding any competition involving social 
                                                          
 255.  Of the states I contacted, the New Jersey Secretary of State was the least helpful and 
seemed to be the least knowledgeable about these new forms.  See Secretary of State—Corporate 
Filings, N.J. DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.nj.gov/state/archives/catsestat03.html (last visited Sept. 
4, 2015).  
 256.  See infra Part V.B (Present and Future). 
 257.  Christopher M. Bruner, Market-Dominant Small Jurisdictions in a Globalizing Financial 
World 58 (Washington & Lee Pub. Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 2013-19, 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343111. 
 258.  Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between Bottom and Top: State Competition for 
Corporate Charters in the Presence of Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681, 687 (2003).  
Learning and network effects accumulate over time and states that enter an area early have an 
advantage.   
 259.  States that are entering the social enterprise area now, after over twenty statutes have 
been passed, are able to learn from the mistakes and imperfections in other state statutes.  As a 
general rule, the more recent social enterprise statutes seem more nuanced and evolved than the 
early statutes.  To date, states have not seemed to be updating their social enterprise statutes as 
other states innovate in their new statutes.  Once the social enterprise statutes are passed, the states 
have shown little interest in amending them, with a notable exception being the FPC in California.  
Plerhoples, supra note 129.  The FPC amendments included a name change and some other minor 
statutory changes. Id.   
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enterprise, but do not seem willing to spend significant funds yet.260  With 
respect to having an expert and responsive legal system, states interested in 
the social enterprise law market may wish to learn from Delaware.  Some 
attribute Delaware’s success to its indeterminate case law and expert 
judiciary.261  Others credit, at least in part, an appropriately responsive 
legislature, the admired Chancery Court, and administrative expertise.262  
States could start by forming a business law court (if they do not already 
have one) and could also make commitments to regularly revise their social 
enterprise law to respond to developments.263  A credible commitment to 
social enterprise might include funding incubator space, being the first state 
to provide a significant tax benefit to social enterprise,264 a responsive 
secretary of state’s office, and perhaps eventually developing a financial 
reliance on the social enterprises formed in the state.265  The corporate bar, 
composed of both litigation and transactional attorneys, likely influences 
the market for business law.266  Attorneys advise their clients where to 
                                                          
 260.  See supra Part IV.D (explaining how most states are currently spending relatively little 
money on social enterprises). 
 261.  Kamar, supra note 173, at 1910–13, 1927–28, 1935. 
 262.  ROMANO, supra note 1, at 39–42. 
 263.  See Anne Tucker Nees, Making a Case for Business Courts: A Survey of and Proposed 
Framework to Evaluate Business Courts, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 477, 488, 502–03 (2007) 
(surveying fifteen business courts and proposing a framework for evaluation of business courts 
that includes attention to “efficiency, quality, and due process”).   
 264.  Significant tax incentives could be a game changer but would be costly to a state and 
should be considered carefully to avoid greenwashing.  The tax incentives offered to date have 
been very small, but tax incentives may be among the most effective, though costly, things a state 
can do to attract social enterprises.  See, e.g., The California Benefit Corporation Discount 
Ordinance, S. F. ADMIN. CODE § 14C.3 (June 3, 2012), 
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=amlegal:sanfrancisco
_ca (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (In its S. F. ADMIN. CODE § 14C.3, San Francisco provided 
preferences in government contracting to California benefit corporations, but these provisions 
expired on Sept. 1, 2015); see Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social 
Enterprise, 66 STAN. L. REV. 387, 439–41 (2014) (arguing that full charitable tax benefits should 
not be offered to social enterprises, but arguing for a few tax accommodations for social 
enterprises such as expanding the deductibility of charitable contributions); cf. Philadelphia First 
City to Offer Green Biz Tax Incentives, SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (Dec. 4, 2009), 
http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/19350 (last visited Sept. 15, 
2013) (providing small tax credits to certain Certified B Corporations) Certified B Corporations 
can be any of the legal entity forms, including benefit corporation, traditional corporation, or 
LLC).   
 265.  Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware’s Dominance and the 
Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1178–79 (2008) (commenting on 
Delaware’s credible commitment, including “investment in legal capital (i.e., judicial expertise, 
case law, a specialized bar, and a business-like Division of Corporations) and its reliance on 
franchise taxes”).  States like Delaware, New York, California, Nevada, and Maryland, which 
already have significant infrastructure built for related entity forms, may have a sizeable lead on 
other states, given that they already have some commitment to other entity types and businesses, 
in addition to the resources needed.   
 266.  Kahan & Kamar, supra note 162, at 705–06 (arguing that “[t]he driving force behind 
many corporate statutes is corporate lawyers” but noting collective action problems and the lack 
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incorporate and are often involved in state politics.  Attorneys are pointed 
to as one of the reasons that states still amend their corporate law in spite of 
the limited financial incentives for most states.267   Attorneys may also be 
involved, directly or indirectly, in getting laws passed that encourage 
formations in their home state or at least encourage local entities to stay in 
their state.268  Attorneys are likely to advise their clients to form in states 
where they are familiar with the state law: primarily their home state and 
Delaware.  Thus, if states are interested in attracting social enterprises, they 
need to reach attorneys and educate them about the benefits of their social 
enterprise laws.269 
Geographic proximity to the financial capital (New York City) and the 
political capital (Washington, D.C.) of the United States may account for 
some of Delaware’s success.270  States near New York City and 
Washington, D.C. may have an advantage in any future social enterprise 
competition.  Social enterprise, however, seems strongest among 
progressives, who are more highly concentrated on the west coast.  
Moreover, geographic proximity to economic and political centers may 
have decreased in importance as travel has become and is becoming much 
easier.  States that are not close to financial and political centers may 
increase their competitiveness by funding excellent transportation systems 
within their state for easy travel for business people and attorneys 
representing those businesses. 
Interestingly, the literature on jurisdictional competition has not paid 
much attention to the influence of the legal academy.  Law professors have 
significant impact on the future of the law through their role in training 
future attorneys.  If law students learn Delaware law while in school, they 
may be more likely to advise their clients to incorporate under Delaware 
law.  Current and former Delaware judges spend a substantial amount of 
time interacting with corporate professors in the legal academy.271  Most 
                                                                                                                                      
of strong incentives (citing William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 715, 737–49 (1998))). 
 267.  Id. at 696. 
 268.  Romano, supra note 151 (noting that “by prodding legislatures to innovate or imitate 
another state’s innovation, in response to exogenous shocks caused by changing business and 
legal circumstances, [lawyers] benefit their clients and thereby themselves, by maintaining, if not 
expanding, their practice, by making their state a more appealing domicile”). 
 269.  As discussed below, it may be easiest and most efficient to reach law professors and law 
students because states may have a more eager audience at law schools than in the busy 
marketplace.   
 270.  Bruner, supra note 257, at 58, 60. 
 271.  Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court Leo Strine writes law review articles and 
teaches at multiple law schools.  Leo Strine Author Page, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=328830 (last visited Nov. 1, 2014) 
(showing over thirty legal articles by Chief Justice Leo Strine and listing his adjunct position at 
University of Pennsylvania Law School along with his lecturer on law position at Harvard Law 
School).  Chief Justice Strine has even co-authored articles with corporate law professors.  See, 
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judges in other states do not seem quite as involved with the legal 
academy.272  States interested in becoming a leader in social enterprise law 
should consider involving the legal academic world in their discussions and 
encouraging more engagement between governmental officials and 
professors.  Incubators for social enterprises, which involve universities and 
state governments may be one way forward in this area.273  Also, if 
professors, especially corporate law professors, are aware of the uniqueness 
of a state’s social enterprise law, and are convinced that it is a valuable 
addition to the entity menu, the professors may discuss the law with their 
classes.274  In time, just as most law students graduate knowing Delaware 
corporate law, we could reach a point where law students graduate knowing 
                                                                                                                                      
e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Matthew Jennejohn, Putting Stockholders 
First, Not the First-Filed Complaint, 69 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 n.* (2013) (stating that 
LawrenceHamermesh is a longtime professor at Widener Law School, and Matthew Jennejohn is 
a former law clerk for then Vice Chancellor Leo Strine on the Delaware Court of Chancery and 
current law professor at J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University)  Vice 
Chancellor Travis Laster, who has been called “Strine on steroids” has become the academic 
liaison on the Delaware Court of Chancery now that former Chancellor Strine has moved to the 
Delaware Supreme Court.  Ashby Jones, On Delaware Vice Chancellor Travis Laster: ‘Strine on 
Steroids’, THE WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb. 11, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/02/11/on-
delaware-vice-chancellor-travis-laster-strine-on-steroids/.  Vice Chancellor Laster has written at 
least fourteen legal articles (some before and some after assuming his position on the bench), has 
lectured at various law schools, and has been involved in the Harvard Law School Program on 
Corporate Governance.  Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster, Harvard Law School Program on 
Corporate Governance, http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/laster-bio.shtml.  Former 
Delaware judges have been and are involved in legal academia, including former Chancellor Bill 
Allen (NYU Law School), former Chief Justice Myron Steele (University of Virginia School of 
Law) and former Justice Jack Jacobs (Columbia Law School and Vanderbilt Law School).  
William T. Allen, N.Y.U SCH. OF L., 
https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.biography&personid=19739 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2015); Jack B. Jacobs, COLUM. L. SCH., 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Jack_Jacobs (last visited Aug. 30, 2015); Jack B. Jacobs, 
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP http://www.sidley.com/people/jack-b-jacobs (last visited Aug. 31, 2015); 
Myron T. Steele, U. OF VA. SCH. OF L., 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/lawweb/faculty.nsf/FHPbI/1427463 (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).   
 272.  There are some obvious exceptions to the statement that judges in states other than 
Delaware do not seem as involved with the legal academy.  One notable exception is Judge 
Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  Richard A. Posner, 
U. OF CHI. L. SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r (last visited Aug 30, 2015) 
(noting Judge Posner’s position as a senior lecturer at the law school, as well as his numerous 
academic articles and books).  Judge Posner, however, is a federal judge and corporate law still is 
primarily a state law subject.   
 273.  Melissa Ip, 5 Social Enterprise Incubators and Accelerators You Should Know About, 
SOC. ENTERPRISE BUZZ (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.socialenterprisebuzz.com/2012/10/03/5-
social-enterprise-incubators-and-accelerators-you-should-know-about/ (noting five major social 
enterprise incubators).  The number of social enterprise incubators has seemed to increase 
exponentially since this article, though most of the incubators are young and small. 
 274.  Gordon Smith, Utah Benefit Corporation Act, THE CONGLOMERATE (May 13, 2014), 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2014/05/utah-benefit-corporation-act.html (wondering whether 
corporate law professors should teach benefit corporation law in the general business 
organizations class). 
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the social enterprise law of the particular state that best communicates and 
demonstrates its value to the legal academy. 
C.  Considering the Future 
State laboratories have been hard at work.  With the assistance of 
proponents like B Lab, states have created various iterations of social 
enterprise statutes and spawned numerous innovations, creating a number 
of entirely new social enterprise entity types.  This evolution is likely to 
continue with over a dozen more states actively considering social 
enterprise statutes.  This experimentation by the states, allowed by 
federalism, is part of what Professor Roberta Romano calls “the genius of 
American corporate law.”275  The evolution of social enterprise laws may 
be the most significant business law product of the state laboratories in the 
past decade.  Professors Erin O’Hara and Larry Ribstein remind us in their 
book The Law Market that firms are free to shop for these new laws.276 
Predicting the future can be a dangerous game, and at this early stage 
it is difficult to tell whether any of the current social enterprise laws will 
prove attractive enough to draw large numbers of entities.  If the social 
enterprise law market does heat up, predicting a winner of that competition 
will also be difficult to do at the beginning of the race.  On one hand, 
smaller states may have more incentive to pursue social enterprise due to 
the potentially significant positive impact on their smaller budgets.277  On 
the other hand, most social enterprises seem to be staying in their home 
state currently, which favors large states like California and New York.  
States with significant infrastructure to service business entities, like 
Delaware and Nevada, also have a nice starting position because those 
resources can be easily used for social enterprises in addition to other, more 
traditional entity types.  The early data on the formation of benefit 
corporations shows Nevada with a strong lead, followed by Delaware, New 
York, and California.278   At this stage, however, it is still much too early to 
declare a clear winner.  In any event, as discussed above, the state 
laboratories, prompted by a number of interest groups, have produced a 
variety of social enterprise laws.279  The evolution of these social enterprise 
                                                          
 275.  ROMANO, supra note 1. 
 276.  ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009). 
 277.  Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of 
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 278 (1990) 
(noting that corporate charter franchise taxes constitutes a relatively high percentage of 
Delaware’s total budget). 
 278.  See infra Appendix A; see also Cooney, Koushyar, Lee & Murray, supra note 30 
(explaining that the unique and easy benefit corporation check box on Nevada’s standard 
incorporation form may be a factor in Nevada’s lead); cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE 
FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 5–12 (2013) (arguing for doing away with unnecessary complexity and 
promoting more simple, common-sense processes). 
 279.  See supra Part V. 
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forms will be interesting to watch over the coming years, and states may 
glean valuable lessons from the jurisdictional competition literature 
involving more established entity types that this Article discussed. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Over less than a decade, we have seen a proliferation of social 
enterprise forms in the United States.  This Article describes some of the 
evolution of these social enterprise forms and the state of the social 
enterprise law market.  Given the indeterminacy of benefit corporation law, 
this Article posits that if social enterprises become more popular, a 
dominant state could eventually engage in significant price discrimination 
and collect significant revenue related to attracting social enterprises.  
Currently, only a relatively small number of social enterprises have been 
formed and thus the financial stakes are quite low.  This Article suggests 
that jurisdictional positioning and interest group theory, rather than serious 
jurisdictional competition, explain why states are passing social enterprise 
statutes.  If social enterprise forms become more widely used in the future, 
states may choose to compete more vigorously in the social enterprise area.  
This Article suggests that interested states could learn from the Delaware 
experience with traditional corporations, coupled with a few additional 
suggestions, in any future attempt to attract social enterprises.   
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Appendix A—Benefit Corporations and L3Cs 
 



















Arizona 2014 5 11/2/15 - - - 
Arkansas 2014 3 10/27/15 - - - 
California  2012 189 11/2/15 - - - 
Connecticut  2014 45 11/2/15 - - - 
Colorado 2014 87 11/2/15 - - - 
Delaware 2013 368 10/28/15 - - - 
Florida 2014 7 11/2/15 - - - 
Hawaii  2011 13 10/27/15 - - - 
Idaho 2015 29 10/28/15 - - - 
Illinois 2013 38 10/27/15 2010 203 11/2/15 
Louisiana  2012 9 11/2/15 2010 240 11/2/15 
Maine - - - 2011 63 11/2/15 
Maryland  2010 33 (50) 10/27/15 - - - 
Massachusetts 2012 42 11/2/15 - - - 
Michigan  - - - 2009 332 11/2/15 
Minnesota  2015 52 11/2/15 - - - 
Montana 2015 Not Effective N/A - - - 
Nebraska 2014 2 10/21/15 - - - 
Nevada 2014 1130 10/19/15 - - - 
New Hampshire 2015 26 11/2/15 - - - 
New Jersey 2011 5 11/2/15 - - - 
New York 2012 245 11/2/15 - - - 
North Carolina - - - 2010283 95 11/2/15 
Oglala Sioux 
Tribe 
- - - 2009 1 11/2/15 
Oregon 2014 96 (590) 10/19/15 - - - 
Pennsylvania 2013 29 11/2/15 - - - 
Rhode Island 2014 4 10/21/15 2012 6 11/2/15 
South Carolina 2012 5 10/23/15 - - - 
Tennessee  2016 Not Effective N/A - - - 
Utah 2014 20 10/21/15 2009 73 11/2/15 
Vermont  2011 17 11/2/15 2008 210 11/2/15 
Virginia 2011 35 11/2/15 - - - 
Washington D.C. 2013 8 10/21/15 - - - 
                                                          
 280.  State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP., 
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).   
 281.  Kate Cooney, Justin Koushyar, and Matthew Lee assisted the author with collecting data 
for earlier versions of this chart.  Cooney, Koushyar, Lee & Murray, supra note 30.  For states 
with an * next to the number, the author was unable to obtain recent data from the state and relied 
on the data reported at http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-benefit-corp. 
 282.  L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L3C (July 6, 2015),  
http://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c_tally.html. 
 283.  North Carolina repealed its L3C statute effective January 1, 2014, but the then-existing 
L3Cs were allowed to continue.  See Brewer, supra note 6. 
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West Virginia 2014 94 10/19/15 - - - 
Wyoming  - - - 2009 37 11/2/15 
Total  2636 (640)   1266  
 
 
 
 
 
